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Petition During Elections
JAMES Bopp, JR. & RICHARD E. COLESON'
INTRODUCTION
"[W]hat's your test to decide whether [an ad is a sham] or... a
genuine issue ad?"'2 The question was asked by Justice Breyer at the
January 2006 oral argument in Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission ("WRTL I").' The case challenged the prohibition 4 on
corporate "electioneering communications"5 as applied to three grass-
1. James Bopp, Jr. (B.A., Indiana University, 1970; J.D., University of Florida,
1973) is an attorney at Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom in Terre Haute, Indiana, and serves
as General Counsel to the James Madison Center for Free Speech. Richard E. Coleson
(B.A., Indiana Wesleyan University, 1973; M.A.R., Asbury Theological Seminary, 1975;
J.D., Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis, 1987) is also an attorney at Bopp,
Coleson & Bostrom in Terre Haute, Indiana. The authors were counsel for several
parties in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). While the authors believe that
McConnell wrongly upheld the electioneering communication against facial attack,
they believe, given McConnell's holding, an as-applied exception for grassroots
lobbying is constitutionally required. The authors have been counsel in numerous
other election law cases. A complete listing of these cases is located at http://www.
jamesmadisoncenter.org/Documents/BoppResume.pdf (Bopp resume). The authors
are grateful to Stephen W. Trask for research and editing assistance. This article
02007 by James Bopp, Jr. and Richard E. Coleson; all rights reserved.
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-21, Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC, 546 U.S.
410 (2006) (No. 04-1581) ("WRTL I"), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral arguments/argumenttranscripts/04-1581.pdf (question from Breyer, J.).
3. 546 U.S. 410 (2006).
4. Prohibition herein refers to 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(a)-(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)
("It is unlawful for any ... corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to make a
contribution or expenditure in connection with any election. . . . '[Clontribution or
expenditure' includes . . . any applicable electioneering communication.").
5. An electioneering communication is a broadcast communication referencing a
clearly identified federal candidate within sixty days before a general election or thirty
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roots lobbying advertisements that Wisconsin Right to Life ("WRTL")
wanted to run in 2004.
Grassroots lobbying is essentially asking citizens to tell lawmakers
how to vote on a matter. In July 2004, WRTL began broadcasting
advertisements encouraging Wisconsin citizens to contact Senators
Feingold and Kohl and encourage them to oppose burgeoning filibus-
ters of President Bush's judicial nominees.6 But because Sen. Feingold
was a candidate, the ads became prohibited electioneering communica-
tions between August 15 and November 2 (Wisconsin's primary and
general election prohibition periods overlapped). 7 WRTL challenged
the constitutionality of the prohibition as applied to its advertisements,
but the district court denied its motion for a preliminary injunction
and dismissed the case.8
Before the Supreme Court, James Bopp, Jr. answered Justice
Breyer's test request: "I think you would look at, one whether the... ad
discusses a current legislative issue; two, whether or not it made any
reference to the legislator beyond lobbying him or her about that spe-
cific issue."9 He continued, "[s]o there should not be any references to
the election or the candidacy of the incumbent or any of those type of
references. And if you had that, you would have a bona fide, genuine
effort to lobby."10 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the dis-
missal and remanded the case for consideration on the merits.'1
On December 21, 2006, the district court held that the prohibi-
tion was unconstitutional as applied to WRTL's ads.' 2 It first decided
that, based on the text and images of the ads, 13 they were "'not the
days before a primary election (or a caucus or convention that nominates candidates)
and is receivable by at least 50,000 of the candidate's intended constituents. See 2
U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (Supp. IV 2004); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29 (2007).
6. Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 198 (D.D.C. 2006)
("WRTL II"). See also id. at 198 n.3 ("Wedding Ad"); id. at n.4 ("Loan Ad"); id. at n.5
("Waiting Ad"). The ads are collected in the Appendix, infra pp. 401-03. The authors
are counsel to WRTL.
7. Id. at 199 n.8.
8. Id. at 199-200.
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-
1581).
10. Id.
11. WRTL 1, 546 U.S. at 411-12.
12. WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 210.
13. The district court rejected, on practical and constitutional grounds, an
inquisition into the speaker's intent or the effect of the ad based on external context or
expert opinion. See id. at 205. The problems of an intent and effect test are addressed
below. See infra Part IV.C.
354 [Vol. 29:353
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functional equivalent of express advocacy."" 4 Employing strict scru-
tiny, it held that the "common denominator between express advocacy
and its functional equivalent ... is the link" between the communica-
tion's contents and the fitness of an identified candidate for office. I5 In
the absence of such a link, the prohibition could not be applied to
WRTL's ads. 6 So the district court's test for a genuine issue ad is
whether there is a link between the content of the communication and
the fitness of the candidate for office. The district court did not say
which ad details were "essential" to its decision, I F as the Supreme
Court had done in creating the MCFL-corporation exemption,' 8 so
there still remains uncertainty in the law about advertisements with
different details.' 9 Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commis-
sion ("WRTL II") is on appeal2 ° and should be decided by the end of
the Court's term in late June 2007.
This article returns to the debate over a proper test by collecting
relevant ads and test proposals in an Appendix and using these as tools
to analyze a test derived from a grassroots lobbying ad (hereinafter the
"PBA Ad") that was recognized as a genuine issue ad by defense expert
Goldstein in McConnell.2 Parts I through III provide the context for
Part IV, which derives and analyzes a test from the PBA Ad. Part I pro-
14. WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d. at 208.
15. Id. at 209-10.
16. Id. (rejecting having a "bright-line rule" as a compelling interest).
17. See infra p. 407 (Appendix).
18. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986) ("MCFL")
("In particular, MCFL has three features essential to our holding that it may not
constitutionally be bound by § 441b's restriction on independent spending.").
19. For example, the 2004 ads did not state the position of Senators Feingold and
Kohl on the filibuster issue. See WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 205; see also infra pp. 401-
03 (Appendix). But WRTL also sought a preliminary injunction and summary
judgment in WRTL II for a 2006 grassroots lobbying ad that did state the positions of
these Senators on the subject of the grassroots lobbying. See WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d
at 203 n.15 (reference to 2006 ad); see also infra p. 405 (CCPA Ad in Appendix). WRTL
II noted that the anti-filibuster ads did not state the Senators' position, but it did not
say whether that absence was essential to its decision. See WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d at
207-08.
20. FEC v. WRTL (No. 06-969) was consolidated with Senator McCain et al. v.
WRTL (No. 06-970) for review by the Supreme Court.
21. The PBA Ad was called the "Feingold Kohl Abortion 60 Ad" and was a
grassroots lobbying ad asking Senators Feingold and Kohl to change their votes on a
bill that would ban partial-birth abortion ("PBA"). It was recognized as a "genuine
issue ad" by defense expert Dr. Goldstein in the McConnell district court. See
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 312 (D.D.C. 2003) (Henderson, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating Goldstein's recognition and setting out
its text); see also id. at 905 (Leon, J.) (stating Goldstein's recognition); id. at 748
20071 355
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vides a brief overview of the legislative, rulemaking, and constitutional
context. Part II demonstrates that McConnell only decided a facial chal-
lenge, leaving as-applied challenges for later. Part III shows that the
prohibition is unconstitutional as applied here. Part IV analyzes a test
derived from a recognized genuine issue ad.
I. LEGISLATIVE, RULEMAKING, AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
A. BCRA and the Electioneering Communications Prohibition
When Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002,22 it amended the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") 23 by,
inter alia, defining "electioneering communications, ' '24 requiring that
information concerning them be disclosed, and adding electioneering
communications to the existing prohibition on corporate and union
expenditures for contributions and independent expenditures at 2
U.S.C. § 441b. 5 Senators Snowe and Jeffords (who introduced the
Snowe-Jeffords Amendment that became the prohibition) declared in
floor debate that the prohibition excluded grassroots lobbying. Senator
Jeffords declared that the proposed prohibition "will not affect the abil-
ity of any organization to urge grassroots contacts with lawmakers on
upcoming votes."26 He repeated the statement for emphasis, "The
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (noting Goldstein's recognition of the ad as "genuine"). See infra p.
401 (PBA Ad in Appendix).
22. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) ("BCRA" or "McCain-Feingold").
23. Codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
24. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (Supp. IV 2004); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29 (2007)
(essentially broadcast communications referencing candidates thirty or sixty days
before primary or general elections respectively).
25. It is sometimes objected that prohibition is inaccurate because corporations and
unions may raise funds into a "separate segregated fund" and that this "political
committee" or "PAC" may pay for electioneering communications. 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 2004). But prohibition is accurate because the corporation
or union itself may not make the communications, i.e., use its general funds (and may
not have, or be able to have, a PAC). Moreover, the Supreme Court used prohibition,
both in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003) ("prohibition"), and WRTL v. FEC,
546 U.S. 410, 410 (2006) ("prohibits"), as did BCRA, 116 Stat. at 91 ("prohibition on
corporate and labor . . . eleciioneering communications"). A corporation and
connected PAC are neither the same voluntary association nor the same legal entity.
Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) ("[The] claim that [a PAC] is merely
the mouthpiece of [the sponsoring organization] is untenable. [The PAC] instead is a
separate legal entity that receives funds from multiple sources and that engages in
independent political advocacy."). See also 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) ("separate
segregated fund" legally distinct from, and its actions not attributable to, connected
corporation).
26. 147 CONG. REC. S2813 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 2001).
356
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Snowe-Jeffords provisions do not stop the ability of any organization to
urge their lawmakers on upcoming issues or votes," declaring views to
the contrary a "distortion[ ]."27 "Any organization can, and should be
able to, use their grassroots communications to urge citizens to contact
their lawmakers," he concluded, and "[under the Snowe-Jeffords provi-
sion, any organization still can undertake this most important task."
28
Co-sponsor Sen. Olympia Snowe said: "[L]et's look at the genuine issue
ad, . . . which this provision would not apply to."' 2 9 Genuine issue ad
was a term of art used throughout BCRA's enactment and the McCon-
nell litigation, including such use by the Supreme Court.
3 °
Senator Paul Wellstone in offering an amendment to the Snowe-
Jeffords Amendment that would eliminate an exemption from the pro-
hibition for nonprofit organizations (under I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(4) or 527)
declared, "I am not talking about ads. .. that are legitimately trying to
influence policy debates. 31 He emphasized his point by repetition, "I
am not talking about legitimate policy ads. I am not talking about ads
that run on any issue."32
From these statements by BCRA's prime sponsors of the election-
eering communication prohibition, it is clear that the congressional
intent was to exclude genuine grassroots lobbying. But Congress didn't
make a statutory exemption. It left creation of the test to FEC rulemak-
ing by giving it authority to make exemptions, provided that no
exempted communication "promotes or supports . . . or attacks or
opposes a candidate" (commonly called "PASO"). 33 So when the FEC
did its 2002 electioneering communications rulemaking it solicited
comments on four proposed alternatives for a grassroots lobbying
exemption.34
The BCRA prime sponsors proposed specific wording for a grass-
roots lobbying exemption and told the FEC that it had authority to
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 147 CONG. REC. S2458 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (emphasis added).
30. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206 n.88 ("[W]e assume that the interests that justify
the regulation of campaign speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine issue
ads."). See infra p. 401 (use as a term of art by experts and lower court).
31. 147 CONG. REc. S2846 (daily ed. March 26, 2001).
32. Id.
33. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(iv) (Supp. IV 2004).
34. Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 51131 (Aug. 7, 2002) ("FEC
Proposed Rules for Comment"), specifically, the alternatives are identified as 3A-D. See
infra p. 408 (FEC Proposed Rules for Comment in Appendix).
20071
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enact their rule under BCRA.35 The sponsors cited the legislative
record to illustrate the types of ads they believed Congress intended to
exempt from the prohibition 36 and urged the FEC to fashion a "bright-
line" rule that corporations, labor unions and membership organiza-
tions could easily apply, that would satisfy the statutory PASO require-
37ments. This lends weight to the argument that the legislative history
indicates an intent to include a grassroots lobbying exemption, and it
reveals that the prime sponsors believed that a rule could be fashioned
that would meet the statutory PASO requirement since the PASO terms
were not employed in their proposed rule.
However, the FEC decided that the prime sponsors' statement that
their rule complied with congressional intent as to the PASO standard
was wrong, "conclud[ing] that communications exempted under any
of the alternatives for this proposal could well be understood to pro-
mote, support, attack, or oppose a Federal candidate."3' The FEC
insisted that "[a]lthough some communications that are devoted exclu-
sively to pending public policy issues before Congress or the Executive
Branch may not be intended to influence a Federal election, it believed
that such communications could be reasonably perceived to promote,
support, attack, or oppose a candidate in some manner. '39 What gov-
erned was hearer perception, based on a much broader PASO interpre-
tation than that urged by the prime sponsors as what Congress
intended. In fact, given the strictness of the rejected Prime Sponsors
Test, the FEC's understanding of PASO clearly encompassed communi-
cations having only the remotest speculative possibility of some mini-
mal electoral effect. One effect of the FEC's refusal to make a rule was
that it retained the sole authority to make any exceptions through the
advisory opinion mechanism.40 Another effect is that grassroots lob-
35. Detailed Comments of BCRA Sponsors Senator John McCain, Senator Russ
Feingold, Representative Christopher Shays, Representative Marty Meehan, Senator
Olympia Snowe, and Senator James Jeffords at 10 (2002) (attached to Letter from Sen.
John McCain, Sen. Russell D. Feingold, et al. to Mai T. Dinh of the FEC), http://www.
fec.gov/pdf/nprm/electioneering-comm/comments/us-congmembers.pdf. See infra
pp. 408-09 (Prime Sponsors Test in Appendix).
36. Id. at 5-10.
37. Id. at 8. The test proposed by the prime sponsors specifically did not employ
PASO terminology, though, to make it less subjective and more user-friendly.
38. Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65190, 65201 (Oct. 23, 2002)
(declining to actually create a grassroots lobbying exception after soliciting comments
on various proposals for a rule). A rule urged at the time by FEC Commissioner
Thomas ("Commissioner Thomas Rule") is set out infra p. 410 (Appendix).
39. Id. at 65201-02
40. The FEC made an exception to the prohibition when it said in FEC Advisory
Opinion 2004-31 that candidate Russ Darrow, Jr.'s name could be used in what were
358 [Vol. 29:353
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bying during prohibition periods, especially the highly active legisla-
tive period before general elections, seems to have largely disappeared,
likely due to the burdens of the PAC option.4'
In 2006, the FEC twice rejected requests to make a rule protecting
genuine grassroots lobbying, even after the Supreme Court in January
of that year expressly pointed to the FEC's authority to promulgate a
grassroots lobbying exception while unanimously rejecting (within less
than a week after oral argument) the FEC's insistence that McConnell
precluded all as-applied constitutional challenges to the prohibition.42
At the WRTL I oral argument, Justice Breyer noted that "[Congress]
told the FEC to go and produce a set of regs that would, in fact, try to
screen out that legitimate 7 percent [of genuine issue ads],"43 and then
demanded of the Solicitor General, "why haven't they done it?" 4 4 The
Solicitor General's response was that "the FEC has found ... that it's
very difficult" and that, "unless you're exceedingly careful," the excep-
tion will be overly large in light of the "creativity of corporate
spenders.
4 5
otherwise electioneering communications by the automobile dealerships that he
founded and that bore his name, but were now under the day-to-day control of his son,
Russ Darrow, III.
41. For example, all of the ideological corporations recognized as nonprofits under
§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code cannot even have a PAC. 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2000). Additionally, the American Civil Liberties Union, which is a
nonprofit under § 501(c)(4), cannot engage in political activity, which includes
forming a PAC. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support
of Appellant at 8 n.3, WRTL I, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-1581). WRTL's Executive
Director, Barbara Lyons, submitted a declaration indicating that PAC money is much
more difficult to raise than general fund money, that this scarce resource is usually
reserved for express-advocacy "independent expenditures," and that WRTL objected to
the compelled speech of having to label as "political" communications things that have
nothing to do with candidate advocacy. Aff. of Barbara L. Lyons, August 9, 2004,
WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2006) (available at 2004 WL 3753188).
42. WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410, 411 (2006) ("Although the FEC has statutory authority
to exempt by regulation certain communications from BCRA's prohibition on
electioneering communications, § 434(f)(3)(B)(iv), at this point, it has not done so for
the types of advertisements at issue here.").
43. The 7% figure came from JONATHAN S. KRASNO, BUYING TIME 1998 (2000),
which was frequently discussed by the three district-court judges in McConnell v. FEC.
See, e.g., McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 743 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)
(noting that Krasno later adjusted the figure to 6.1%, id. at 745, while plaintiffs'
expert, Dr. Gibson, argued that the percentage of genuine issue ads should be between
50.5-60% based on the same data, id. at 745-46).
44. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43-44, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (No. 04-1581),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/
04-1581.pdf.
45. Id. at 45.
20071 359
7
Bopp and Coleson: Distinguishing "Genuine" from "Sham' in Grassroots Lobbying: Prot
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007
CAMPBELL LAW REvIEw [Vol. 29:353
The first 2006 rulemaking request was submitted to the FEC on
February 16 by counsel for a broad-spectrum coalition of advocacy
groups.46 Although the coalition's petition urged an expedited
rulemaking to permit grassroots lobbying through much of the 2006
cycle of caucuses, conventions, and elections, the FEC on March 16
simply solicited comments about the possibility of initiating a
rulemaking to be submitted on April 17," and on September 5 it
declared its intention to make no rule.4 The second 2006 request was
for an interim final rule, proposed on August 3 by FEC Commissioner
von Spakosvsky, to be put into effect during the general election prohi-
bition period (and subsequent rulemaking), but the FEC again
refused. 9 In both of these refusals, the FEC noted the two pending as-
applied challenges,5 ° stating that the courts might provide guidance.5 '
46. Petitioners were the AFL-CIO, the Alliance for Justice, the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, the National Education Association, and OMB Watch.
See Rulemaking Petition: Exception for Certain "Grassroots Lobbying"
Communications From the Definition of "Electioneering Communication," 71 Fed.
Reg. 13557 (Mar. 16, 2006) (notice of availability). The proposed rule is available at
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/lobbying/orig-petition.pdf, and is also set out infra as
the Broad Coalition Rule on p. 411 (Appendix).
47. Rulemaking Petition: Exception for Certain "Grassroots Lobbying"
Communications From the Definition of "Electioneering Communication," 71 Fed.
Reg. 13557.
48. Exception for Certain "Grassroots Lobbying" Communications From the
Definition of "Electioneering Communication," 71 Fed. Reg. 52295 (Sept. 1, 2006)
(notice of disposition of petition for rulemaking).
49. Memorandum from Hans A. von Spakovsky, "Interim Final Rule Exempting
Grassroots Lobbying Communications From the Definition of 'Electioneering
Communication"' (FEC Agenda Document No. 06-53), available at http://www.fec.
gov/agenda/2006/mtgdocO6-53.pdf; FEC, "Minutes of an Open Meeting of the [FEC],
Tuesday, August 29, 2006" at 5, available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2006/
approve06-58.pdf (motion to approve Interim Final Rule failed by 3-3 vote).
50. In addition to the WRTL case now on appeal for the second time, the Supreme
Court has before it the appeal of Christian Civic League of Me., Inc. v. FEC, No. 06-
0614, 2006 WL 2792683 (D.D.C. 2006) ("CCLM"), another grassroots lobbying
challenge to the electioneering communications prohibition, but in CCLM a different
three-judge panel on the same district court (as decided WRTL II) dismissed the case
as not being within the exception to mootness for cases capable of repetition yet
evading review. Id. at *1. WRTL II noted the other court's mootness holding, but
"disagree[d]," holding that WRTL was clearly within the mootness exception. WRTL II,
466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 201-02 (D.D.C. 2006). The present authors also represent CCLM
and have asked the Supreme Court to consider the case with WRTL II on the merits.
51. See Exception for Certain "Grassroots Lobbying" Communications From the
Definition of "Electioneering Communication," 71 Fed. Reg. at 52296 (declining
broad-coalition petition); Audio Recording of FEC Open Meeting Agenda, Aug. 29,
2006, available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2006/agenda20060829.shtml)
360
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B. Constitutional Protections
With BCRA's electioneering communication prohibition, incum-
bent politicians eliminated the ability of citizens of ordinary means to
effectively associate and communicate in order to petition their repre-
sentatives at the most critical legislative times on vital issues that arise
suddenly at times beyond the people's control (although the timing is
often within the control of incumbent politicians, who can take advan-
tage of the prohibition for their own purposes). But the people are sov-
52ereign, not the politicians who are supposed to represent them. In
our constitutional republic, government is restricted to the powers
expressly granted by the people.5 3 The people created legislators to
represent them,5 4 and amended the Constitution to require that Sena-
tors be "elected by the people." 5 The people mandated Congress not
to restrict their rights to speak, associate, 56 and petition in the exercise
of the people's sovereign right to participate in representative self-
government.
5 7
The First Amendment is designed "'to assure [the] unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."'' 5'  "'[Sipeech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-govern-
ment.'" 5 9 "It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in
(declining interim rule). The FEC Office of General Counsel's ("OGC") August 29,
2006 Memorandum (Agenda Document No. 06-57) urging the FEC to await guidance
from the courts in WRTL II and CCL is available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2006/
mtgdoc06-57.pdf. The FEC's complete rule-making file is available at http://www.fec.
gov/law/law rulemakings.shtml#lobbyingw/sae. While the FEC OGC encouraged the
FEC Commissioners to look to these two cases for guidance, the OGC has also
expended great effort to avoid any ruling on the merits on those two cases. The FEC
neglected to mention in its public statements that WRTL offered to settle its case
against the FEC if the FEC adopted the broad-spectrum coalition's rule.
52. U.S. CONST. pmbl; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) ("In a republic...
the people are sovereign ... ").
53. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. IV, § 4.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
56. "[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee freedom to associate with
others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas .... " Buckley, 424
U.S. at 16 (citations and quotation indicators omitted).
57. U.S. CONSr. amend. I.
58. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)).
59. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978) (citation
omitted).
2007]
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a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a
corporation rather than an individual.
60
While the individuals who make up a corporation such as WRTL
could make electioneering communications,6' when they associate
into an effective advocacy group,62 the corporation is prohibited from
broadcasting grassroots lobbying ads for up to 90 days during an elec-
tion year (and more in some circumstances),63 even though these are
times of intense legislative activity.64 Citizen groups formed under the
right of association are an essential component of democracy in
action. Buckley reaffirmed the constitutional protection for associa-
60. Id. at 777.
61. 2 U.S.C. § 434(0 (Supp. IV 2004) (requiring only disclosure if spending
exceeds $10,000 in a calendar year).
62. Effective nonprofit ideological groups incorporate primarily to protect directors
from individual liability (e.g., for slips and falls on premises), not to assist in profit-
making enterprise.
63. In WRTL I, the AFL-CIO provided the scope of the periods of the 2003-04
election cycle in which President Bush and Vice-President Cheney could not be
mentioned in broadcast ads (even though the President was unopposed and their
nominations were a foregone conclusion): "[B]eginning on December 14, 2003, 30
days before the first primary or caucus, [the prohibition] precluded broadcast
references to President Bush in a series of geographic blackouts that continuously
rippled throughout the nation, blocking every broadcast outlet, wherever located,
whose signal could reach 50,000 persons in an upcoming primary or caucus state,
until June 8, 2004." Brief for American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 13-14 n.5, WRTL 1, 546 U.S.
410 (2006) (No. 04-1581). "Additional 30-day blackout periods transpired from July
18 until the August 17, 2004 Wyoming caucus, and from July 25 until the August 24
Alaska primary." Id. "This blackout became national in scope on July 31, 30 days
before the Republican National Convention, and it then continued until the November
2 general election." Id.
64. As to acts of Congress ads that would be captured by the prohibition, the ACLU
in McConnell listed twenty-nine congressional actions in the sixty days before the
November 2000 election that were of special interest to it. Joint Appendix at 622-26,
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (No. 02-1674) 2003 WL 22070885. Judge
Leon, in his McConnell district court opinion, listed "important, and controversial,
pieces of legislation" considered by Congress within the time frame of prohibition
periods that he said illustrate "BCRA's potential impact on genuine issue advocacy."
251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 793 n.98 (D.D.C. 2003). See also id. at 910-11 (finding that
genuine issue ads about important legislation are run in the sixty days before general
elections). In WRTL I, the Chamber of Commerce documented 157 roll call votes in
Congress in the sixty days before the November 2004 election. Brief for Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae supporting Appellant at
6, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-1581) (citations omitted), and added that "it
is not unusual for legislators to maneuver to set sensitive votes in the election period."
Id. at 6 (citing Andrew Mollison, Votes on Guns, Marriage Slated; GOP Leaders in House
Push Symbolic Bills, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST., Sep. 28, 2004, at 3A.).
[Vol. 29:353362
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tion: "[E]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group asso-
ciation. . . . [Consequently,] the First and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee freedom to associate with others for the common advance-
ment of political beliefs and ideas."65 "[Alction which may have the
effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest
scrutiny."" This high level of constitutional protection flows from the
essential function of an association, which is to amplify the voice of its
members, thereby facilitating their effective participation in our demo-
cratic republic.67
Grassroots lobbying is also protected by freedoms not considered
in McConnell, specifically, the inherent constitutional right of sover-
eign people to participate in self-government 68 and the express right to
petition, along with a line of cases protecting the right of corporations
to petition lawmakers, both directly and through the public. The right
of corporations to petition the legislative and executive branches was
recognized in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr.69 In the
Noerr-Pennington line of cases, the Supreme Court held that attempts
to influence the passage or enforcement of laws were constitutionally
protected and essential to representative government.7"
65. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (quotation and citation marks
omitted).
66. Id. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)). When
only an associational interest is involved, as with limits on cash contributions to
candidates, the government need only demonstrate that the "contribution regulation
was 'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important interest."' Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000). But when speech is limited, as here,
the statute is subject to strict scrutiny, requiring the government to demonstrate that
the regulation is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64-65. This is the same standard employed for expressive
association. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657-59 (2001).
67. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
68. See BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002) ("this right to
petition ... is implied by 'the very idea of a government, republican in form"' (citation
omitted)).
69. 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961) (noting the corporate party's right of petition was
protected by the Bill of Rights).
70. "In a representative democracy such as this, these [legislative and executive]
branches of government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the
whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their
wishes known to their representatives." Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137. "The right of petition
is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly
impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms." Id. at 138. See also Cal. Motor
20071
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In Bellotti, the Supreme Court applied the right of petition to cor-
porations seeking "to publicize their views on a proposed constitu-
tional amendment.., to be submitted.., as a ballot question"71 and
held that this was constitutionally protected.72 Bellotti noted that "the
First Amendment protects the right of corporations to petition legisla-
tive and administrative bodies" and concluded that "there hardly can
be less reason for allowing corporate views to be presented openly to
the people when they are to take action in their sovereign capacity. 73
These cases stand for the overarching principle that the people have a
right to petition incumbent politicians, directly or by grassroots lobby-
ing, about their official acts without regard to the context in which the
need to assert the right to petition arises. And, if they choose to do so
through corporate entities, the right to petition is still constitutionally
protected.
Because of these powerful constitutional mandates, the govern-
ment must bear the burden of justifying statutes that target speech
based on its content-especially speech at the core of our constitu-
tional system of government-under the strict-scrutiny test.74 "Under
the strict-scrutiny test, [the government has] the burden to prove that
the [challenged provision] is (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a com-
pelling state interest.75 "In order ... to show that a given statute is
narrowly tailored, [the State] must demonstrate that it does not
'unnecessarily circumscrib[e] protected expression. '' 76 And specifi-
cally, where the government mandates the use of the PAC alternative,
as it does with the electioneering communication prohibition, the gov-
ernment bears the strict scrutiny burden of justifying this infringe-
ment on the peoples' liberty.
7 7
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) ("the right to petition
extends to all departments of the government").
71. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 769 (1978).
72. Id. at 776-78, 790-96.
73. Id. at 791 n.31.
74. See WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 209-10 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying strict
scrutiny after concluding that WRTL's ads were not the functional equivalent of
express advocacy). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39, 44-45 (1976) ("exacting
scrutiny"); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496 (1985); MCFL, 479 U.S.
238, 251-52 (1986) ("compelling interest").
75. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002) (quoting
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982), and citing Eu v. San Francisco County
Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989)).
76. Id. (citations omitted).
77. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 256; Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 658 (1990).
364 [Vol. 29:353
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Where a First Amendment facial challenge is brought (i.e., the
remedy sought is enjoined enforcement as to all applications), the
Supreme Court still requires a compelling interest and narrow tailor-
ing,78 but it then requires the challenger to prove that the restriction is
substantially overbroad "relative to the scope of the law's plainly legiti-
mate applications. '"" McConnell decided only a facial challenge to the
prohibition, 0 and the Court expressly held in WRTL I that neither the
language nor the logic of McConnell precluded a challenge to the prohi-
bition as applied to grassroots lobbying."' McConnell did not recog-
nize that the government had met its strict-scrutiny burden as applied
to the "genuine issue ads" that McConnell recognized., 2 And McConnell
did not consider the express right of petition and the inherent neces-
sity of people participating in self-government. When these additional
rights are added to the rights of free expression and association, the
electioneering communication prohibition must yield to the weight of
constitutional necessity and allow an exception for grassroots lobby-
ing, especially where, as discussed in Part IV, "genuine" is distinguish-
able from "sham" grassroots lobbying.
II. THE MCCONNELL CONTEXT
When the Supreme Court declared in McConnell that "we assume
that the interests that justify the regulation of campaign speech might
not apply to the regulation of genuine issue ads,"8 3 it was using a term
of art that was employed throughout the McConnell litigation84 and
78. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003).
79. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 120 (2003) (citation omitted). See also
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
80. 540 U.S. at 206 ("vast majority" of issue ads during prohibition period were
functional equivalent of express advocacy).
81. 546 U.S. 410, 411-12 (2006) (the Supreme Court "did not purport to resolve
future as-applied challenges").
82. 540 U.S. at 206 & n.88.
83. Id. at 206 n.88 (emphasis added).
84. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 527 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly,
J.) ("I will generally use the nomenclature candidate-centered issue advertisements ...
and genuine or pure issue advertisements. Genuine issue advertisements include both
legislation-centered and general image-centered issue advertisements."). See also id. at
881 (Leon, J.) (Finding 289: "Advertisements designed to genuinely influence debate
over a particular issue are known as 'true' or 'genuine' issue advertisements, while
those issue advertisements designed to influence a [sic] federal elections are known as
'electioneering' or 'candidate- centered' issue advertisements." (citations omitted)); id.
at 914 (section of Judge Leon's Findings entitled, "Representative Examples of Genuine
Issue Advertisements Aired Within 30 Days of a Primary Election, or 60 Days of a General
Election, and Mentioning the Name of a Federal Candidate"); id. at 918 (section of Judge
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keeping the door open to an as-applied challenge to protect genuine
issue ads. The following discussion of McConnell's facial-overbreadth
constitutional analysis in the context of the overall McConnell litigation
demonstrates that (A) the recognized class of "genuine issue ads"
included grassroots lobbying and (B) McConnell held only that the
overbreadth inherent in prohibiting these genuine issue ads was not
"substantial" enough for facial invalidation.
A. "Genuine Issue Ads" Include Grassroots Lobbying
Throughout the McConnell litigation, grassroots lobbying was per-
ceived as different in kind from electioneering. Judge Leon, the con-
trolling vote in the district court, clearly thought that grassroots
lobbying must be excluded from the "sham issue ad" category. He
found that grassroots lobbying did not support or oppose candidates,
declaring that his PASO-oriented approach to the electioneering com-
munication definition
assures that there will be no real, let alone substantial, deterrent effect
on political discourse unrelated to federal elections. Genuine issue
advocacy thereby remains exempt from both the backup definition and
its attendant disclosure requirements and source restrictions. Simi-
larly, genuine issue advocacy, specifically of the legislation-centered type,
that mentions a federal candidate's name in the context of urging viewers
to inform their representatives or senators how to vote on an upcoming bill
will not be regulated by the backup definition because it does not promote,
support, attack, or oppose the election of that candidate. See Findings
368-73 (providing examples of legislation-centered advertisements that
do not promote, support, attack, or oppose the election of a federal
candidate).85
Leon's Findings entitled "Representative Examples of Candidate-Centered Issue
Advertisements Aired Within 30 Days of a Primary Election or 60 Days of a General
Election").
85. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 802-03 (Leon, J.) (emphasis added except as to
"unrelated" and "see"). Judge Leon provided "representative" examples of both
candidate-centered issue ads, id. at 918, and genuine issue ads that would have been
prohibited by the primary definition of "electioneering communications" (the
definition eventually upheld by the Supreme Court in McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190
n.73). McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 914-18. One called "Barker," id. at 914-15
("Barker Ad"), is set out infra at 401-02 (Appendix). Judge Leon noted that defense
expert Magleby identified the Barker Ad as a "genuine issue advertisement because it
'doesn't mention how [the candidate] voted. It doesn't represent what [the candidate]
has said about the issue. The body of the ad has no referent to [the candidate]
whatsoever. The only referent to [the candidate] is the call line."' Id. at 915 (citation
omitted). Judge Leon noted that Magleby "explain[ed] that 'a generic call your
Congressman, call your Senator, when then linked to a legislation and call your
[Vol. 29:353
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The McConnell district court judges noted the wide-ranging expert esti-
mates as to what percentage of prohibited ads were "genuine issue ads"
(which included grassroots lobbying), with possibly more in years with
hot-button legislative issues.8 6 Before the Supreme Court, the McCon-
nell defendants conceded that up to six percent of all ads subject to the
prohibition were "genuine issue ads."
8 7
The term genuine issue ad was also used by defense expert Ken-
neth M. Goldstein in his expert witness report in McConnell.88 Gold-
stein reported concerning the analysis that he had asked a team of
student coders to do on advertisements in an effort to determine their
nature: "In this report, I refer to ads coded as providing information or
urging action as 'Genuine Issue Ads,' and ads coded as generating sup-
port or opposition for a particular candidate as 'Electioneering
Ads."' 89 Goldstein recognized as a genuine issue ad a National Pro-
Life Alliance advertisement, entitled "Feingold Kohl Abortion 60"
Congressman or Senator about this legislation without a referent to their position on
the issue, seems to me substantively different than when they are mentioned in view of
what their position is on that issue'"-and by "'substantively different"' Magleby
meant "'with respect to whether the advertisement communicates an electioneering
message."' Id. (citation omitted) (excerpt from questions and answers in cross exam).
86. See, e.g., McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 798-99 (Leon, J.). The experts used
different data sets, disputed changed evaluations by student evaluators employed for
studies, and employed different formulas that yielded widely disparate results. Judge
Leon picked two of the fairly moderate percentages as being sufficient to hold the
prohibition overbroad. Id. at 798 ("Percentage discrepancies aside, I find that 14.7%
and 17% of the ads run in the months leading up to the 1998 and 2000 elections,
respectively, represents a 'substantial amount' of protected speech and renders the
primary definition defective as constitutionally overbroad."). Judge Henderson's
finding of fact 43 found that "credible record evidence indicates that BCRA will
actually capture a vast number of 'genuine' issue advertisements." Id. at 307. She cited
evidence in the record that the 7% (of genuine issue ads) cited by the Executive
Director of the Brennan Center for Justice to Congress in 2000 was rejected by him as
"flat out false" with the correct number being forty percent. Id. at 309 (citation
omitted). And she noted plaintiff expert Dr. James Gibson's testimony that if a
Brennan Center publication entitled Buying Time 1998 had employed the original
codings by Dr. Goldstein's students (instead of changing some from genuine to sham),
"64 per cent of all group-sponsored issue ads aired during the last 60 days of the 1998
election were 'genuine' and would have been covered by BCRA." Id. at 310 (citation
omitted) (noting that no defense expert challenged this finding, although Dr. Gibson
revised it to at least 50.5% and likely more).
87. Brief for the FEC at 105-06, McConnell 540 U.S. 93. Cf. Redacted Brief of
Defendants at 131, 161, McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (same).
88. Amended Expert Report of Kenneth M. Goldstein on Behalf of Intervenor
Defendants at 7, McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 2002 WL 33100340.
89. Id.
2007] 367
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(called the "PBA Ad" herein), 90 that mentioned Wisconsin Senators
Feingold and Kohl (a candidate) and was broadcast within sixty days
of the 2000 general election. 9 1 This defense-expert-endorsed "genuine
issue ad" from the McConnell record is remarkably like the grassroots-
lobbying Wedding Ad run by WRTL.92
B. McConnell's Facial-Challenge Analysis
Since McConnell was a facial challenge, the central issues before
the Supreme Court were (1) whether the prohibition was narrowly tai-
lored to a compelling interest in general and (2) whether the prohibi-
tion was substantially overbroad for reaching too many "genuine issue
ads."
1. Strict Scrutiny by Analogy
Rather than start from scratch in the mandatory strict-scrutiny
analysis, McConnell employed an abbreviated analysis by analogy.
First, it noted that, since Buckley, Congress had been able to require
corporations and unions to use a PAC "to finance advertisements
expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in federal elec-
tions," which "provided ... a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to
engage in express advocacy."'9 3 In justification of this restriction,
McConnell cited the interest in regulating corporations (and mentioned
circumvention) and concluded: "In light of our precedents, plaintiffs
do not contest that the Government has a compelling interest in regu-
lating advertisements that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
candidate for federal office."94
As to narrow tailoring, the Court continued in the "express advo-
cacy" analogy it had set up by answering "plaintiffs['] argu[ment] that
the justifications that adequately support the regulation of express
90. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. at 312 (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (quoting this PBA Ad, which is set out in the Appendix, infra p. 401). Judge
Henderson noted that Goldstein was "certain" that the ad was a genuine issue ad,
although the two authors of a Brennan Center study based on Goldstein's research
split on whether it was genuine). Id. See also supra note 21.
91. Id. at 905 (Leon, J.) (noting that Goldstein considered the PBA Ad a "genuine
issue advertisement" and had testified that it was not "clearly intended to support or
oppose the election of a candidate"). See also id. at 748 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (noting
Goldstein's recognition of the ad as "genuine"). See also supra note 21.
92. See infra pp. 402-03 (Appendix). Note that this expert-recognized genuine issue
ad stated the position of Senators Feingold and Kohl on the issue, although the
Wedding Ad did not mention their position on the judicial filibusters.
93. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003) (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
368 [Vol. 29:353
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advocacy do not apply to significant quantities of speech encompassed
by the definition of electioneering communications" with the holding
that "[tihis argument fails to the extent that the issue ads broadcast
during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and gen-
eral elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy.
Consequently, a central question in WRTL II is whether the pro-
posed ads are the "functional equivalent of express advocacy."96 "[T]o
the extent that [WRTL's] ads . . .are [not] . . .equivalent," the argu-
ment of inadequate justification for the prohibition does not "fail."97
This functional equivalence question is answered by comparing
WRTL's ads to the acknowledged "genuine issue ad" in the McConnell
record98 and the example of the sham ad cited in McConnell, i.e., the
Yellowtail Ad. 99 The district court in WRTL II held that the key to
functional equivalence is whether there is a "link between the words
and images used in the ad and the fitness, or lack thereof, of the candi-
date for public office."100 It is easy to distinguish the genuine PBA Ad
from the sham Yellowtail Ad-and to see that the ads of WRTL are
genuine issue ads-on the basis of such a test. As shown in Part IV
this "link" helps create a test to distinguish "genuine" from "sham."
2. Substantiality of the Overbreadth
As noted above, expert opinions in McConnell varied widely as to
how many genuine issue ads were captured by the electioneering com-
munication prohibition.' So the Supreme Court was faced with the
problem of how to resolve the degree of facial overbreadth on disputed
facts and disparate findings by the three district-court judges (and in a
relatively short amount of time before the prohibition periods began
going into effect before the 2004 elections).
95. Id. at 205-06 (emphasis added). The Court went on to say, "The justifications
for the regulation of express advocacy apply equally to ads aired during those periods
if the ads are intended to influence the voters' decisions and have that effect." Id. at
206. This intent-and-effect language was borrowed from defense expert reports
attempting to demonstrate that the percentage of genuine issue ads captured by the
prohibition was not substantial enough for facial invalidation, so it is merely
descriptive of the sham ads that had just been declared to be "the functional equivalent
of express advocacy" and is not (nor could it be) a constitutionally-permissible test in
and of itself. See infra Part IV.C.
96. 540 U.S. at 206.
97. Id.
98. See infra p. 401 (PBA Ad in Appendix).
99. See 540 U.S. at 193 & n.78 (providing text of ad). See infra p. 402 (Yellowtail
Ad in Appendix).
100. WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 209 (D.D.C. 2006).
101. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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The Court's specific substantial overbreadth analysis began with
the following framing of the issue: "[P]laintiffs argue that the justifica-
tions that adequately support the regulation of express advocacy do
not apply to significant quantities of speech encompassed by the defini-
tion of electioneering communications." 10 2 It ended by holding that
"[w]e are therefore not persuaded that plaintiffs have carried their
heavy burden of proving that [the prohibition] is overbroad.' 10 3 "Even
if we assumed that BCRA will inhibit some constitutionally protected
corporate and union speech," the Court continued, "that assumption
would not 'justify prohibiting all enforcement' of the law unless its
application to protected speech is substantial, 'not only in an absolute
sense, but also relative to the scope of the law's plainly legitimate appli-
cations. ' '1 0 4 It concluded that "[flar from establishing that BCRA's
application to pure issue ads is substantial, either in an absolute sense
or relative to its application to election-related advertising, the record
strongly supports the contrary conclusion. 10 5
This issue and holding are clearly framed in the language of a
First Amendment "substantial" overbreadth analysis, so there is no
mistaking what the Court was doing in this section of McConnell. It
was recognizing that there were genuine issue ads and trying to show
that the number of genuine issue ads captured by the electioneering
communication prohibition was not sufficiently substantial for facial
invalidation of the prohibition. If there were no genuine issue ads, 10 6
there would be no reason for this section on the substantiality of the
prohibition's effect on them. Between this issue and holding, the
Court made the following analysis to show that the asserted over-
breadth was insubstantial, and that it could be even less substantial in
the future:
The precise percentage of issue ads that clearly identified a candidate
and were aired during those relatively brief preelection timespans but
had no electioneering purpose is a matter of dispute between the par-
ties and among the judges on the District Court. See 251 F. Supp. 2d,
at 307-312 (Henderson, J.); id., at 583-587 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at
796-798 (Leon, J.). Nevertheless, the vast majority of ads clearly had
such a purpose. Annenberg Report 13-14; App. 1330-1348 (Krasno &
102. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205-06 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 207 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
104. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119-20 (2003)) (emphasis added).
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 580 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.) (Finding 2.11.7: "There is a disputed issue of fact about whether
advertisements [that qualify as electioneering communications] are ever pure issue
advertisements.").
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Sorauf Expert Report); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 573-578 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.);
id., at 826-827 (Leon, J.). Moreover, whatever the precise percentage
may have been in the past, in the future corporations and unions may
finance genuine issue ads during those timeframes by simply avoiding
any specific reference to federal candidates, or in doubtful cases by
paying for the ad from a segregated fund. n88
n88 As Justice Kennedy emphasizes in dissent [reference omit-
ted], we assume that the interests that justify the regulation of
campaign speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine
issue ads. . l07
The Court did not made its "in the future" comment in isolation as a
statement rejecting future as-applied challenges, nor as somehow shift-
ing the strict scrutiny burden from the government and placing on
challengers the burden of proving that these options are inadequate,
10 8
but rather between its opening issue statement and holding on over-
breadth. This indicates that the comment was made for the purpose of
demonstrating that the effect of the prohibition on "genuine issue
ads"'0 9 or "pure issue ads" 110 was not "significant""' or "substan-
tial," '1 2 i.e., that "plaintiffs ha[d not] carried their heavy burden of
proving that [the prohibition] is overbroad."' 3 Thus, the Court in
McConnell was doing a straightforward substantial overbreadth analy-
sis when it used the phrase, "[mioreover, whatever the precise percent-
age may have been in the past, in the future ... , "4 And this "precise
percentage" reference is in turn within a paragraph that spoke of "the
precise percentage" being "a matter of dispute," but that the "vast major-
ity" of electioneering communications had an "electioneering pur-
pose.""' 5 These are words clearly addressed to the substantiality (or
lack thereof) of facial overbreadth.
So the "in the future" comment, in context, was about lack of over-
breadth in the future. The Court was considering the "percentage" of
"genuine issue ads" that would be captured by the prohibition (as com-
pared to the "sham issue ads" that McConnell recognized were the
107. Id. at 206 & n.88 (emphasis added).
108. Defendants in WRTL made both of these arguments, which are erroneous as
seen in the present analysis. WRTL I rejected the no-as-applied-challenges argument.
546 U.S. 410 (2006). WRTL II employed traditional strict scrutiny analysis, thereby
rejecting the burden-shifting argument. 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 209-10 (D.D.C. 2006).
109. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
110. Id. at 207.
111. Id. at 206.
112. Id. at 207.
113. Id.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
2007]
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intended target of the prohibition) in order to determine whether the
overbreadth was sufficiently broad for facial invalidation. After noting
that the experts had fought over the "precise percentage," the Court
declared that prospectively the overbreadth could be reduced in any
event because, with knowledge of the prohibition, speakers could take
measures to avoid the prohibition's reach in some situations. 1 6 But
this "in the future" statement could not apply to all situations because
the Court immediately left open as-applied challenges by recognizing
the category of "genuine issue ads" and expressly stating that it
"assume[d] that the interests that justify the regulation of campaign
speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine issue ads.""' 7
Consequently, the meaning of the "in the future comment" is con-
fined to its context and simply means that prospectively the over-
breadth of the prohibition is not sufficiently substantial for facial
invalidation. The comment may not be ripped from its context and
forced to mean things entirely foreign to its plain contextual meaning.
The comment does not shift the strict scrutiny burden from the gov-
116. If any residual doubt on this point could possibly remain, it should be erased
by the fact that Judge Leon used nearly identical "future" language in holding that the
primary definition of electioneering communication was unconstitutionally overbroad
and likely to be higher in a "particularly contentious, or active, legislative period."
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 798-99 (D.D.C. 2003). He continued,
"[Tihere is reason to believe that the amount of issue advocacy likely to be generated in
future election cycles will be at least as substantial as it was during those years." Id. at
799 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court was simply answering Judge Leon's
argument by saying that "in the future" percentages might actually drop in light of
people's knowledge of the elements of the prohibition, making overbreadth less
substantial. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
117. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206 n.88. See also WRTL I, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (as-
applied challenges permitted despite argument based on "in the future" statement).
The "in the future" comment was part of the two-part facial overbreadth analysis,
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 207, for which the McConnell Court cited the leading case of
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). The McConnell Court summarized its
holding under the two parts as follows: "Far from establishing that BCRA's application
to pure issue ads is substantial, either in an absolute sense or relative to its application
to election-related advertising, the record strongly supports the contrary conclusion."
540 U.S. at 207 (emphasis added). The discussion of "pure issue ads," id., or "genuine
issue ads," id. at 206 & n.88, was to establish that the prohibition was not overbroad
in the context of "election-related advertising," id. at 207, which included both
"electioneering ads" and "genuine issue ads," to use the terminology of defendants'
expert Goldstein in his report in the McConnell litigation. See supra note 89.
Consequently, the Supreme Court was required by its analysis to talk about
"genuine issue ads" in its facial overbreadth analysis. It was not gratuitously throwing
in words about "genuine issue ads" that were irrelevant to its analysis and intended to
be employed outside that context. So its "in the future" sentence had a distinct
meaning in the facial overbreadth analysis context, but none beyond it.
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ernment and force challengers to prove that the mentioned options are
inadequate. It does not say that the other options are adequate. In
fact, the Court clearly held that the PAC option was "constitutionally
sufficient" only as to "express advocacy."'11 Only to the extent that an
ad can be proven by the government to be the "functional equivalent of
express advocacy"1 9 is the PAC option adequate. So McConnell only
employed facial overbreadth analysis to sustain the prohibition and left
for another day the task of distinguishing "genuine" from "sham."
III. AS-APPLIED STRICT SCRUTINY OF THE PROHIBITION
Applicable constitutional protections have already been discussed
in Part I.B. This Part sets out more specifically the analysis for consid-
ering the constitutionality of the prohibition as applied to genuine
grassroots lobbying and then applies it to show that the prohibition is
unconstitutional as applied to WRTL's ads.
A. Constitutional Guidelines
We deal here with activity at the core of the American system of
constitutional government, so we must begin with first principles, i.e.,
the constitutional guarantees, asserted interests, and the need to work
with a scalpel instead of a splitting maul.' 2 ° At issue here is the right
of the sovereign people to participate in self-government through guar-
anteed freedoms of expression, association, and petition. McConnell
addressed the free expression and association freedoms only to the
extent of deciding that the prohibition's infringement on genuine issue
ads was not sufficiently substantial to warrant facial invalidation. The
right to petition was not asserted or considered in McConnell, but it is
central to these grassroots lobbying cases and is "one of 'the most pre-
cious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.'"121
As to governmental interest, McConnell pointed to "a compelling
interest in regulating advertisements that expressly advocate the elec-
118. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203 (emphasis added).
119. See id. at 206.
120. The Supreme Court in MCFL noted that "freedom of thought and speech 'is the
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom"' and
warned of the temptation "to accept in small increments a loss that would be
unthinkable if inflicted all at once." 479 U.S. 238, 264-65 (1986). "For this reason, we
must be as vigilant against the modest diminution of speech as we are against its
sweeping restriction," it continued, and "curtail speech only to the degree necessary to
meet the particular problem at hand." Id. at 265. "Congress [must not choose] too
blunt an instrument for such a delicate task." Id.
121. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (citation omitted).
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tion or defeat of a candidate for federal office." 122 Because regulating
express advocacy has never been held, in and of itself, to be a compel-
ling interest, the Court was apparently framing the interest in this way
to set up its analysis-by-analogy holding that Congress could restrict
communications "to the extent that . . . [they] are the functional
equivalent of express advocacy." 123 In this prohibition context, the
Court was simply asserting the corporate-form interest: "The . . . ques-
tion-whether the state interest is compelling-is easily answered by
our prior decisions . . . , which represent respect for the legislative
judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure
require particularly careful regulation." 124 That this corporate-form
concern is the foundation for the prohibition is self-evident from the
fact that only corporations are prohibited from making electioneering
communications (as are unions for parity).
No disclosure interest is at issue because BCRA's disclosure
requirements were not challenged by WRTL. So the ads contain the
122. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205. See also supra Part II.B.I. The Supreme Court has
spoken of an overarching governmental interest in "the integrity of our system of
representative democracy," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976), or "the
integrity of the electoral process," id. at 58, but the Court has not engaged in strict
scrutiny at this highly-generalized level of abstraction, choosing instead to restrict its
constitutional analysis to the more specific interests discussed here.
123. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
124. Id. at 205 (quotation marks and citations omitted). McConnell then added:
"Moreover, recent cases have recognized that certain restrictions on corporate electoral
involvement permissibly hedge against 'circumvention of valid contribution limits."'
Id. (brackets and citations omitted). The two cases cited, FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S.
146, 155 (2003), and FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 533
U.S. 431, 456 (2001) ("Col. Rep. II"), identified circumvention as a legitimate interest
in the context of a corporation making contributions to candidates, not independent
expenditures. Col. Rep. II involved coordinated expenditures, which are considered
contributions. 533 U.S. at 456. As to independent expenditures (which are neither
coordinated nor contributions), Buckley expressly reversed an appellate court holding
that an independent expenditures cap was constitutionally permissible "to prevent
circumvention of the contribution limitations," 424 U.S. at 44, and instead held that,
"[r]ather than preventing circumvention of the contribution limitations, [the cap]
severely restricts all independent advocacy despite its substantially diminished
potential for abuse. Id. at 47. Since McConnell expressly declared that sham issue ads
are "the functional equivalent of " independent expenditures, 540 U.S. at 206, no
circumvention interest should be applicable where genuine issue ads are at issue
because they are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy. But even if making
a donation to a corporation that is then used for express advocacy is a cognizable
circumvention of a donor's contribution limits, that interest could only engage as to
express advocacy or its functional equivalent, i.e., "sham" or so-called "issue ads." See
id. at 129 ("[P]olitical parties and candidates used the availability of so-called issue
ads to circumvent FECA's limitations").
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required disclaimer, 125 all information required by Congress would be
reported, and McConnell's concern about "misleading names"
1 26
would be eliminated. Quid pro quo corruption, or the appearance
thereof, is inapplicable because the expenditures at issue are
independent.
12 7
Although the First Amendment strictly prohibits abridgement of
the people's liberties of expression, association, and petition,' 28 the
Supreme Court has held that the Constitution permits infringements
in extraordinary cases where the government proves that the infringe-
ment is necessary to advance a compelling interest and the chosen
means is narrowly-tailored and is the least-restrictive means to further
that interest. 129 So the underlying question is whether the prohibition
is narrowly-tailored and is the least-restrictive way to protect the corpo-
rate-form interest as to a "genuine issue ad," such as the PBA Ad. 3 °
For its facial challenge analysis, McConnell placed the functional-equiv-
alence test atop this foundational question, but absent a valid corpo-
rate-form concern, the foundation for a prohibition crumbles and there
can be neither a prohibition nor a functional-equivalence test. The
functional-equivalence concern is not freestanding as to a prohibition.
B. Less Restrictive Means
Strict scrutiny of the prohibition readily reveals two less restrictive
means of dealing with the corporate-form concern and the overlaid
functional-equivalence concern. The first eliminates the corporate-
form concern by eliminating corporate money, which is discussed
125. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.11 (2007). WRTL's ads, infra pp. 401-04 (Appendix), show
the required disclaimer.
126. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 128.
127. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 ("The absence of prearrangement and coordination of
an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the
expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be
given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate."). If Congress
had asserted any quid pro quo interest in BCRA with respect to electioneering
communications, it would have capped amounts spent as it originally did with
independent expenditures (which was rebuffed in Buckley). Congress did require the
PAC alternative (with its source and amount restrictions on donations to the PAC), but
that was based on the corporate-form interest, not quid pro quo, because there is no
cap on how much a PAC may spend on independent expenditures or electioneering
communications.
128. U.S. CONST. amend I.
129. See, e.g., MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986) ("the state interest.., can be met in
a manner less restrictive than imposing the full panoply of regulations that accompany
status as a political committee").
130. See infra p. 401 (Appendix).
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here. The second, which is the focus of Part IV, retains corporate
money but eliminates the functional-equivalence concern by defining
grassroots lobbying narrowly. These are sufficient to show that the
prohibition is not narrowly tailored as applied.
When it enacted BCRA, Congress had before it one less restrictive
means of eliminating any concerns about corporate-form corruption,
namely "a segregated bank account which consists of funds contrib-
uted solely by individuals who are United States citizens or nationals
or lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . directly to this
account for electioneering communications . ". ..- Congress said
that an entity permitted to broadcast electioneering communications
and required to report disbursements for them would only have to
report contributors of $1,000 or more to that account (as opposed to
general fund donors) if it made its disbursements for electioneering
communications from such a segregated bank account. 132 Although
the corporate-form interest is arguably not strong as applied to WRTL,
which is an ideological nonprofit, 133 VRTL stated in its complaint that
it would make all disbursements for electioneering communications
from such an account if the court would not grant relief from the pro-
hibition as to disbursements from its general account, and WRTL actu-
ally raised funds into such an account in hopes of being able to
continue its grassroots lobbying with such funds.
131. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(E) (Supp. IV 2004) (account may also be used for other
purposes).
132. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1) (Supp. IV 2004).
133. In fact, McConnell held that the prohibition could not be applied to ideological
nonprofits that qualify as MCFL-corporations. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 209-11
(2003); see MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263-64 (an MCFL-corporation must be ideological,
nonstock, nonprofit corporation that cannot engage in business or receive corporate
contributions). While WRTL and CCLM are ideological nonprofits, neither is a
"qualified nonprofit corporation" under the FEC's narrow rule implementing the
MCFL-corporation exemption. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.10 (2007) (giving requirements for
such QNPs). What would prevent them from certifying that they qualify as QNP would
be receipt of business income or corporate donations, regardless of how minimal. But
the segregated bank account would eliminate precisely these disqualifiers from QNP
status. Note also that all Circuits to consider the matter have rejected the FEC's
wooden position that if a group receives any business income or business corporation
contributions it doesn't qualify, and these courts have permitted such income and
contributions, as long as they were "de minimis" and not "substantial." See FEC v.
NRA, 254 F.3d 173, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. FEC,
113 F.3d 129,130 (8th Cir. 1997); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1363-65 (8th Cir.
1994); N.C. Right to Life v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 714 (4th Cir. 1999); FEC v.
Survival Educ. Fund, 65 F.3d 285, 292 (2nd Cir. 1995).
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Had Congress enacted this segregated bank account option in
place of the prohibition, Congress would have entirely eliminated cor-
porate-form corruption concerns because the corporation would not
have been using any money from business activity or receipts from
other corporations. This option is further narrowly tailored to corpo-
rate-form concerns because it would be more useful to ideological non-
profit corporations than business behemoths. This is because the
former primarily raise money from donations by like-minded donors,
which in this case would be only certain qualified individuals, while
the latter raise their substantial funds through business activity done
with the advantage of the corporate form. So this option advances
First Amendment freedoms.
It bears repetition that the reason for a prohibition is the corporate-
form concern. The segregated bank account eliminates that interest.
While corporations should be able to engage in genuine grassroots lob-
bying without employing either a PAC or a segregated bank account,
the latter reveals a less-restrictive means to accommodate the corpo-
rate-form interest than a prohibition. 134 Therefore, the prohibition is
unconstitutional as applied.
And as discussed next, careful definition of an exception from the
prohibition for grassroots lobbying would accommodate any govern-
mental interest while retaining the use of corporate funds.' 35 This is
134. It may be objected that the segregated bank account option does not provide
the same level of restriction and disclosure as is imposed on PACs. A PAC is a
"separate segregated fund," 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 2004), and is
distinguished by source and amount restrictions on its receipts as well as the
requirement to disclose all of its transactions on the theory that for PACs everything
they do is clearly related to elections. But this objection loses sight of the fact that the
interest underpinning the prohibition is the corporate-form interest, which is
eliminated by a "separate segregated fund." And for persons permitted by BCRA to
make electioneering communications (because the lack of the corporate-form interest
prohibits Congress from imposing a prohibition) there is no source and amount
restriction. Moreover, as noted next, a "genuine issue ad" like the PBA Ad is not even
the functional equivalent of express advocacy, so analysis by analogy to express
advocacy restrictions is not permissible.
135. For example, if Congress had adopted a statutory exemption from the
electioneering communication prohibition for grassroots lobbying along the lines of
the Prime Sponsors Rule, see infra pp. 408-09 (Appendix), that would have been a less
restrictive means than the prohibition and would have, according to the prime
sponsors, resolved all concerns about asserted governmental interests. See Detailed
Comments of BCRA Sponsors Senator John McCain, Senator Russ Feingold,
Representative Christopher Shays, Representative Marty Meehan, Senator Olympia
Snowe, and Senator James Jeffords at 10 (attached to Letter from Sen. John McCain, Sen.
Russell D. Feingold, et al. to Ms. Mai T. Dinh of the FEC (Aug. 23, 2002)).
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less restrictive, again showing that the prohibition is not narrowly
tailored.1
36
IV. A TEST FROM A MCCONNELL "GENUINE ISSUE AD"
All three district court judges in their separate McConnell opin-
ions noted that defense expert Goldstein recognized the PBA Ad as a
"genuine issue ad," and Judge Henderson included the text of the
ad.' 3 7 So when the Supreme Court in McConnell recognized that some
"genuine issue ads" were captured by the electioneering communica-
tion prohibition, 138 the Justices were fully aware of the ad and likely
had it in mind as a "genuine issue ad." The PBA Ad has remarkable
similarities to WRTL's ads, including the facts that both were run by
pro-life ideological corporations, both mentioned Senators Feingold
and Kohl (one a candidate and the other not) in similar ways, and both
were grassroots lobbying ads about current matters before the legisla-
tive branch. The one notable difference is that the PBA Ad mentioned
the position of the Senators on the issue that was the subject of the
grassroots lobbying, while the WRTL ads did not. So the PBA Ad pro-
vides a unique benchmark for measuring whether WRTL's ads are gen-
136. Yet another means that would be less restrictive on the people's First
Amendment liberties would be for Congress to recess during elections along the
British model. For example, Congress might recess for sixty days before general
elections and thereby reduce the need for grassroots lobbying during these times.
Along these lines, some have suggested a shorter prohibition period. See, e.g., Richard
L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to Determine the
Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1773, 1802 (2001) ("Narrow drafting may include shorter time periods," e.g., 30
days rather than 60 days). It must be remembered that part of the perceived problem
set out to justify the electioneering communication prohibition is based on matters
wholly in control of Congress or the executive branch and out of the hands of the
people, namely, (a) that Congress remains in session right up to elections, (b) the
period before the general election is a particularly intense and important legislative
time, see McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 911 (D.D.C. 2003) (Leon, J.) (stating
that prohibition periods "are often periods of intense legislative activity" and "[slome
of the President's or Attorney General's boldest initiatives are advanced during
election years-often within 60 days of an election"), and (c) where the person being
lobbied is an incumbent, he or she has become a candidate because of the official's
decision to run for office again. Of course, if Congress adjourned before elections, that
would not resolve the potential need for grassroots lobbying of the executive branch.
137. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (Henderson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (noting Goldstein's recognition of the PBA Ad, called there the
"Feingold, Kohl Abortion 60" ad, as genuine and setting it out in full), 748 (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.) (noting Goldstein's recognition of the ad as "genuine"), 905 (Leon, J.)
(noting that Goldstein considered the ad a "genuine issue advertisement").
138. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 n.88 (2003).
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uine issue ads and, for present purposes, creating a test to distinguish
genuine from sham in grassroots lobbying. This part focuses on: (A)
the advantage of a judicial test; (B) the immateriality of minor effects;
(C) the necessity of focus on the text; (D) prior acknowledgments that
genuine is distinguishable from sham; (E) deriving a test from the PBA
ad; and (F) analyzing other elements of a test from various rule
proposals.
A. Advantage of a Judicial Test
The First Amendment requires that courts at least provide judicial
relief for ads substantially similar to the "genuine" PBA Ad and then
sort out the contours of a grassroots lobbying exception on a case-by-
case basis. The district court in WRTL II took this approach, declaring
the prohibition unconstitutional as applied to three specific ads with-
out providing a holding with a detailed test of general applicability,
although it did give some guidance as to a proper test.139 It left to
"future as-applied challenges," likely "evaluated on an emergency
basis," to sort out the constitutionality of the prohibition as applied to
other ads. 140 But a case-by-case approach has disadvantages.
14 1
A preferable approach is a judicial test with sufficient detail to
indicate where the First Amendment mandates a safe haven for genu-
ine grassroots lobbying-the sort of test created for MCFL-corpora-
tions. 142 It was clear from the WRTL I oral argument that members of
139. See generally WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2006).
140. Id. at 205.
141. One disadvantage is that the FEC has, to date, adopted a scorched-earth
discovery and litigation approach to these cases, meaning small citizen groups daring
to face this foe must endure intrusive discovery, intimidating depositions, substantial
loss of time from their ideological mission, significant expense, and no hope of the
court-awarded attorneys fees and costs available in a successful suit against a state.
This will always be the case if a contextual intent and effect test is employed, as
advocated by the FEC. Things may improve under WRTL II, which demonstrated the
necessity of an analysis limited to the "four corners" of the communication, 466 F.
Supp. 2d at 207, and rejected a broad-ranging intent and effect test. Id. at 205-06.
However, the FEC may insist that any factual differences in new cases somehow
warrant invasive, burdensome discovery again. As the WRTL and CCLM cases have
demonstrated, even with BCRA-mandated expedition, it has been impossible for
WRTL or CCLM to obtain judicial relief in time to run their ads while the need existed.
(This may improve somewhat in the wake of WRTL II, but that is not certain.) Case-
by-case litigation is not the best approach for judicial economy. And the core political
freedoms at issue require bright lines that favor speakers, not speech restrictors, so
that the people and their liberties have room to breath without the delay and burden of
multiple cases.
142. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986).
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the Supreme Court were interested in such a test. Justice Breyer, for
example, asked: "what's your test?"'1 4 3 Justice Stevens expressed the
need for a test.'4 4 The Solicitor General argued BCRA's bright-line
approach is required because "there isn't any neat division between
issue ads and candidate ads."' 145 And Justice Scalia responded that he
"thought that ... the line that the [McConnell] opinion was trying to
... draw... was whether it's an issue ad or ... a phony issue ad."'
14 6
B. Immateriality of Minor, Incidental Effects
The mere possibility of some incidental, de minimis effect on an
election would not be constitutionally cognizable as a governmental
interest. The FEC has already conceded this before the Supreme Court
in WRTL I when Justice Scalia asked: "You think Congress has the
power to prohibit any First Amendment... conduct that might have an
impact on the election? I mean, is that the criterion for whether it...
can be prohibited?"' 47 The Solicitor General responded: "No, Justice
Scalia, it's not."' 48
And after extensive discovery and employing two experts, the FEC
could only come up with the possibility that WRTL's ads might have
some unquantifiable "electoral effect.' 149 The WRTL II court reviewed
the FEC's best efforts to prove this electoral effect at summary judg-
143. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-
1581).
144. Id. at 15 ("there isn't a practical way to tell the difference").
145. Id. at 50. A mere desire for a bright line is not a compelling interest. MCFL,
479 U.S. at 263. Bright lines are preferred in the First Amendment, of course, but only
when they favor speakers (i.e., they create a First Amendment safe haven), not speech
restrictors. See id. at 263-64 (providing holding of general applicability for MCFL-
corporation exception). The unanimous reversal and remand of WRTL I necessarily
rejected the Solicitor General's argument on this point.
146. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (No. 04-1581).
147. Id. at 31.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Defendant Federal Election Commission's Memorandum in Support
of its Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment at 9, WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2006) (The FEC
argued that the ads would "likely" have a significant electoral effect."). What Bailey
said at deposition was that WRTL's 'Waiting' Ad "could have, could have, it might have
no impact, but could have substantial impact on the election itself." Bailey Deposition
at 43, WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (No. 04-1260). Moreover, when called upon to
compare the Waiting Ad, infra pp. 403-04 (Appendix), to the PBA Ad, infra p. 401
(Appendix), expert Bailey thought that WRTL's ad was more subtle and so might be
more effective in influencing elections. Bailey Dep. at 42-43. This statement, by
logical extension, yields the remarkable proposition that the less an ad is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy the stronger the government interest is in regulating it.
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ment and then rejected the "highly questionable assumption[ I] that...
the speculative conjecture of experts can actually project the 'likely
impact' of a given ad on the electoral process," for which assumption it
did not find "sufficient evidence.' 50 So the government could not
meet its strict scrutiny burden to prove that it has a cognizable interest
in regulating WRTL's ads.
It is important also to note that no corporate-form governmental
interest exists as to grassroots lobbying per se because the Supreme
Court has recognized that "the First Amendment protects the right of
corporations to petition legislative and administrative bodies."
151
There is no inherent risk of corruption in asking citizens to contact
their legislators, which citizens may or may not do, based on their own
choice. Therefore, any anti-corruption interest relating to grassroots
lobbying must arise from some risk of corruption relating to elections.
And that must be something more than some speculative, minimal
effect.
C. Necessity of Focus on the Text
WRTL II held that the proper functional equivalence analysis is
limited to "consideration [of] language within the four corners of the
... ads."'152 It said that an intent and effect test is "practically unac-
ceptable because as-applied challenges . . . must be conducted during
the expedited circumstances of the closing days of a campaign when
litigating contextual framework issues and expert testimony analysis is
simply not workable."' 53 "More importantly," the court added, "it is
theoretically unacceptable because it proceeds on the highly question-
able assumptions that: (1) any subjective intent to affect the election,
150. 466 F. Supp. at 205-06 (emphasis in original).
151. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978) (citing
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972)); E.
R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961).
152. WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 207. There is, of course, a relevant context which
the district court treated as given, based on the facts of this case, and so did not
discuss. The first part of the relevant context is whether the electioneering
communication definition is met, i.e., was there a targeted broadcast communication
within a prohibition period that referenced a federal candidate? This goes to whether
the ad is an electioneering communication to begin with. The second part of the
relevant context is about whether the communication is genuine grassroots lobbying,
i.e., is the lobbying about a current legislative or executive branch matter? The
existence of this relevant context, which requires a limited look beyond the four
corners of the document, in no way justifies an intent-and-effect inquisition into a
broader context.
153. Id. at 205.
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regardless of its degree of importance, should negate an otherwise gen-
uine issue ad; and (2) . . . experts can actually project the 'likely'
impact of a given ad on the electoral process.' 5 4 It wrote that the
Supreme Court had already recognized that "delving into a speaker's
subjective intent is both dangerous and undesirable when First Amend-
ment freedoms are at stake.'
' 5 5
McConnell did not purport, in any way, to overrule Buckley on this
point, which is central to free expression, when it followed its holding
that sham issue ads could be prohibited to corporations and unions
because they were "the functional equivalent of express advocacy"'
15 6
with the statement that "[t]he justifications for the regulation of
express advocacy apply equally to ads aired during those periods if the
ads are intended to influence the voters' decisions and have that
effect.' 5 7 McConnell had already specifically connected this "intent"
language to the sham "Yellowtail Ad" as being an ad "no less clearly
intended to influence the election" than an express advocacy ad. 158 So
the Supreme Court was not creating a new "intent and effect" test for
determining whether a communication is "the functional equivalent of
express advocacy." Rather, the McConnell Court was simply citing lan-
guage used by defense expert Kenneth Goldstein, who used student
coders to separate ads provided to them into the categories of "Genu-
ine Issue Ads" or "Electioneering Ads."' 59 "Specifically, coders were
asked whether the purpose of the ad was to 'generate support or oppo-
sition for candidate,' or to 'provide information or urge action. '"160
Based on the coders' perceptions and his analysis, Goldstein argued
"that BCRA's definition of Electioneering Communications accurately
captures those ads that have the purpose or effect of supporting candi-
dates for election to office.' 16 1 The Supreme Court was plainly echoing
154. Id. at 205-06 (emphasis in original).
155. Id. at 206. The district court pointed to the Supreme Court's rejection of an
intent and effect test in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (citing with approval
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)).
156. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 193 & n.78.
159. Amended Expert Report of Kenneth M. Goldstein on Behalf of Intervenor
Defendants at 24, McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. 02-581
and consolidated cases). Goldstein's report, as presented to the United States
Supreme Court in Vol. III of the Joint Appendix, is available at http://www.law.
stanford.edu/publications/projects/campaignfinance/. In the Supreme Court's
McConnell records, the report was in Defendants' Exhibits, Vol. 3, Tab 7.
160. Id. at 24 n.20.
161. Id. at 26 (emphasis added)
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that conclusion for purposes of its broad-brush facial-challenge analy-
sis, not creating a new and constitutionally problematic test based on
criteria it had already rejected, as the district court noted.16 2
And the expert-endorsed PBA Ad was declared genuine based on
its content, not some contextual probing into intent and effect (as were
all ads coded by Dr. Goldstein's student coders for the Buying Time
studies that were central to the McConnell evidence). 163 Furthermore,
the Prime Sponsors Rule, a grassroots lobbying exemption rule pro-
posed to the FEC in 2002 by Senators McCain and Feingold and other
prime BCRA sponsors, likewise examined the four corners of a com-
munication and required no contextual inquisition into intent and
effect.' 64 So based on practicality, constitutional imperative, and the
FEC's failed effort to prove cognizable intent and effect through discov-
ery and expert testimony, the WRTL II court rightly rejected any reli-
ance on an intent and effect test to distinguish genuine from sham
issue ads. 165
D. Acknowledgments that Genuine Can Be Distinguished from Sham
Although the Solicitor General argued to the Supreme Court in the
WRTL I oral argument that BCRA's bright-line approach is required
because "there isn't any neat division between issue ads and candidate
ads,"166 the BCRA prime sponsors who have intervened as defendants
in WRTL II (and opposed a grassroots lobbying exemption) conceded
in the 2002 FEC rulemaking on "electioneering communications" that
it is possible to distinguish genuine from sham solely on the basis of
the content of the communication. They did so by proposing their
own rule to do just that:
Prime Sponsors Rule
The term "electioneering communication" does not include any com-
munication that:
(x)(A) Meets all of the following criteria: (i) the communication con-
cerns only a legislative or executive branch matter; (ii) the communica-
tion's only reference to the clearly identified federal candidate is a
162. WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 206 (D.D.C. 2006).
163. See, e.g., McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 307 (Henderson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("The students were asked to 'code' the ads based on their
content.").
164. See infra pp. 408-09 (Appendix).
165. WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
166. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (No. 04-1581).
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statement urging the public to contact the candidate and ask that he or
she take a particular position on the legislative or executive branch
matter; and (iii) the communication refers to the candidate only by use
of the term "Your Congressman," "Your Senator," "Your Member of
Congress" or a similar reference and does not include the name or like-
ness of the candidate in any form, including as part of an Internet
address; and (iv) the communication contains no reference to any
political party.
(B) The criteria in Paragraph (A) are not met if the communication
includes any reference to: (i) the candidate's record or position on any
issue; (ii) the candidate's character, qualifications or fitness for office;
or (iii) the candidate's election or candidacy. 16 7
This same, content-only rule was set out as the perfect balance of com-
peting interests in the Campaign and Media Legal Center's com-
ments' 6 8 and in the comments by Common Cause and Democracy
21.169 Lawrence Noble' 7 ° submitted comments for the Center for
Responsive Politics in the 2002 rulemaking that also proposed a con-
tent-based rule to distinguish genuine from sham:
CRP Rule
(c) Electioneering communication does not include any communication
that:
(6) (i) Contains the following elements:
(A) The communication is devoted exclusively to a
pending legislative or executive branch matter;
(B) The communication's only reference to a clearly
identified Federal candidate is a statement urging
the public to contact that Federal candidate or a
reference that asks the candidate to take a particu-
lar position on the pending legislative or executive
branch matter; and
167. See sources cited infra note 259.
168. Letter from Glen Shor to Mai T. Dinh at 10-11 (Aug. 21, 2002) ("CMLC
Comments") (Trevor Potter, who was General Counsel for CMLC when these
comments were submitted, id. at 1, is presently counsel for the Campaign Legal Center
representing Senator McCain et al. in WRTL II as intervenors who insist that it is
"startling[ ]" that the WRTL II court employed a test that "focuses solely on the face of
the ads." Jurisdictional Statement at 15, WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195.).
169. Letter from DonaldJ. Simon to Mai T. Dinh at 12 (Aug. 22, 2002) (adding that
"this proposed exception properly balances the competing concerns" and avoids
"sham communications").
170. Noble was FEC General Counsel from 1987 to 2000. See http://skadden.com/
index.cfm?contentlD=45&biolD=6033 (biographical information).
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(ii) Does not contain any of the following elements:
(A) Any reference to any political party, including the
candidate's political party;
(B) Any reference to the candidate's record or position
on any issue; or
(C) Any reference to the candidate's character, qualifi-
cations or fitness for office or to the candidate's
election or candidacy.'
71
While these two rule proposals differ slightly, e.g., as to whether
the official who is the subject of grassroots lobbying may be identified
by name or only by title, they both acknowledge that genuine and
sham are distinguishable in grassroots lobbying based on a content-
based test. So the true issue is not whether genuine can be distin-
guished from sham in the grassroots lobbying context but which test
does it best.
E. A Test from the PBA Ad
Because the PBA Ad was recognized as a "genuine issue ad" in the
McConnell litigation, 72 it is what the Supreme Court had in mind
when it spoke of "genuine issue ads" and not what it meant by "the
functional equivalent of express advocacy.' 1 73 Therefore, that ad nec-
essarily lacks any cognizable electoral effect and is a good pattern for
creating a test. It also serves as a benchmark for measuring other pos-
sible elements from the various rules proposed by and to the FEC in
prior rulemaking efforts. In other words, if the PBA Ad is already a
genuine issue ad, so that its details pose no risk to elections, then what
improvement (if any) would be added by piling on more restrictive ele-
ments that are not readily derivable from it? Of course, a test based on
the PBA Ad would not include grassroots lobbying concerning an exec-
utive branch action or general public issue advertising that might men-
tion a candidate. Thus, a rule modeled on the PBA Ad would not be
the precise rule that the FEC should ultimately adopt if the Supreme
Court upholds the district court's holding in WRTL II. As may be seen
from the numerous comments over proposed wording in the 2002 FEC
171. Letter from Lawrence Noble and Paul Sanford to Mai T. Dinh (Aug. 21, 2002)
("CRP Comments") (reprinted in the attached "Comments of FEC Watch and the
Center for Responsive Politics" at 5-6).
172. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 748 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.) (noting defense-expert Goldstein's recognition of the ad as a genuine issue
ad).
173. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003).
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rulemaking about an electioneering communication exemption, 174
there may be arguments over specific terms in actual rulemaking.
However, the authors intend their following suggested "PBA Ad Test"
test to contribute to the discussion concerning how a court could state
an appropriate judicial test that would provide sufficient guidance for
such a rulemaking. The PBA Ad Test is stated in the form of the
Supreme Court's statement of the MCFL-corporation test, including
some of that opinion's language. 175 The suggested test is based on the
details of the PBA Ad and employs some language from prior rule pro-
posals. It is the sort of judicial test that the Supreme Court could state
in its opinion in the WRTL case, just as it stated a similarly worded test
in MCFL. It demonstrates that the Supreme Court could indeed state
a judicial test along these lines to distinguish genuine issue ads from
sham ads in the grassroots lobbying context.
PBA Ad Test
In particular, the PBA Ad has two features essential to our holding that
this grassroots lobbying ad may not constitutionally be prohibited
under § 441b as an electioneering communication. First, based on the
contents of the communication, it focuses on a current legislative
branch matter, takes a position on the matter, and urges the public to
ask a legislator to take a particular position or action with respect to
the matter in his or her official capacity. Second, consistent with the
focus on the legislative branch matter, the ad does not mention any
election, candidacy, political party, or challenger, or the official's char-
acter, qualifications, or fitness for office, and any statement of the leg-
islator's position on the matter is objectively accurate and based on
publicly available means of verification. These particular features fur-
174. The comments on the 2002 FEC rulemaking on "electioneering
communications" are available online at http://www.fec.gov/law/RulemakingArchive.
shtml#electioneering and provide numerous valuable insights as to a proper test, some
of which are included here. For example, the comments of the American Taxpayers
Association note that a test should not be limited to just legislative and judicial branch
matters because nonprofits "frequently do grass roots lobbying ads to influence public
opinion on general issues, rather than specific pending legislation." Letter from Heidi
K. Abegg to Mai T. Dinh at 7 (Aug. 21, 2002) ("ATA Comments"). This is so because
"there may be several competing pieces of legislation, none of which completely
reflects the non-profit's position." Id. "[T]here may be proposals bandied about, but
none formally introduced" or "a non-profit may not yet be ready to take a position on
particular legislation but may want to lobby generally on the issue." Id. at 7-8. So they
should not be compelled "to take a stand on one particular piece of legislation." Id. at
8. "[A]rmed with... knowledge" about the issue, the citizen can "decide how best to
lobby." Id.
175. See MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986) (stating the test for MCFL-
corporations).
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ther assure that there is no constitutionally cognizable risk of an
attempt to influence an election. So long as the corporation follows
this pattern, it is free to argue the merits of the matter and the official's
position on it as if it were not a corporation.
The first part of this test makes the ad a grassroots lobbying ad and, by
its "focus"' 7 6 requirement, eliminates cognizable electoral effect. The
second part further assures a lack of such cognizable effect. An effort
has been made to avoid vagueness so far as language and brevity
permit.
The PBA Ad Test's proscription against mentioning "the official's
character, qualifications, or fitness for office is based on the under-
standing that it does not exclude a forceful discussion of the merits of
the matter coupled with the corporation's and official's positions on
the matter, which together merely say that the candidate is wrong or
right on the issue (grassroots lobbying is used both to firm up previ-
ously taken positions and to change minds), not wrong for office. This
could be made clear in a court's opinion.
This PBA Ad Test describes the subject of a grassroots lobbying
appeal with the phrase "focuses on a particular current legislative
branch matter." As may be seen in the Appendix, the FEC Proposed
Rules for Comment from the 2002 rulemaking offered the following
alternatives: "(A) "[ius devoted exclusively to urging support for or
opposition to particular pending legislative or executive matters": (B)
"[c]oncerns only a pending legislative or executive matter"; (C)
"Irlefers to a specific piece of legislation or legislative proposal, either
by formal name, popular name or bill number; or refers to a general
public policy issue capable of redress by legislation or executive
action"; (D) "[u]rges support of or opposition to any legislation, resolu-
tion, institutional action, or any policy proposal. ' 17 7 Words such as
''exclusively" and "only" are employed in an effort to limit the ability of
a communication to focus on anything other than the subject of the
grassroots lobbying, but they introduce the potential for overzealous
176. The comments of the AFL-CIO in the 2002 rulemaking make several valuable
observations on the nature of a final FEC rule, such as employing language that
permits a communication to talk of other general matters in addition to the grassroots
lobbying message. In other words, the whole communication should not have to be
"focused on," "exclusively devoted to," or similarly restricted to one topic but may
include a grassroots lobbying message focused on a current public policy issue (and
the rest of the message could speak of other matters, e.g., news concerning unions).
See Letter from Laurence E. Gold and Michael B. Trister to Mai T. Dinh at 13 (Aug. 29,
2002).
177. See infra p. 408 (Appendix).
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enforcement by the FEC. 178 The use of "focuses on" in the PBA Ad Test
captures the idea of limiting the subject of the grassroots lobbying por-
tion of a communication to the matter at issue without risking over-
reaching enforcement. Words such as "particular" and "pending" seek
to assure that the matter is a real and "current"'179 public issue, but
"pending" raises questions about whether a legislative issue must have
taken the form of an introduced bill. Note that the Broad Coalition
Rule requires that "[tlhe communication exclusively discusses a partic-
ular current legislative or executive branch matter, '"18 while the Prime
Sponsors Rule merely specifies that it "concerns only a legislative or
executive branch matter.
'
"
1 8 1
The Broad Coalition Rule would also require that the object of the
grassroots lobbying be an "incumbent." 182 It is, of course, noteworthy
that genuine grassroots lobbying asks citizens to contact officials in
their lawmaker capacity, i.e., as persons able to act in an official capac-
ity on legislative or executive branch matters. These incumbents are
persons who have chosen to become (and seek reelection as) the peo-
ple's representatives in a system where the people are sovereign and
178. For example, in Christian Civic League of Me., Inc. v. FEC, 433 F. Supp. 2d 81
(D.D.C. 2006), the Crossroads Ad at issue said, "Unfortunately, your senators voted
against the Marriage Protection Amendment two years ago." See infra p. 405
(Appendix). The district court adopted the FEC's argument in stating that "the
League's advertisement-which characterizes Senator Snowe's past stance on the
Marriage Protection Amendment as '[u]nfortunate[ ]'-is the sort of veiled attack that
the Supreme Court has warned may improperly influence an election" and so
pronounced it a "sham." CCLM, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (opinion denying motion for
preliminary injunction). Even though Senator Snowe was running unopposed in a
primary election, the district court insisted that "the advertisement might have the
effect of encouraging a new candidate to oppose Senator Snowe, reducing the number
of votes cast for her in the primary, weakening her support in the general election, or
otherwise undermining her efforts to gather such support, including by raising funds
for her reelection." Id. If there is a chance that the FEC would employ "exclusively" or
"only" in a test as excluding a term such as "unfortunately" (which is only a statement
of group's viewpoint on the issue and their representative's position on it), then such
terms should be excluded from any test or rule.
179. A grassroots lobbying ad that is a genuine issue ad deals with a current
legislative or executive branch matter, not a past issue, which McConnell judges found
to be a useful way to distinguish genuine from sham issue ads. See, e.g., McConnell v.
FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 577 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (rejecting ad as
genuine for "failing to note whether there was any upcoming legislation related to the
past votes that the advertisement might have been targeting"); id. at 918 (Leon, J.) (his
examples of "candidate-centered ads" cited past votes of legislators).
180. See infra p. 411 (Appendix).
181. See infra pp. 408-09 (Appendix).
182. See infra p. 411 (Appendix).
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have guaranteed self-government rights of speech, association, and
petition for the very purpose of maintaining the accountability of those
representatives. Challengers to the incumbent lack this ability to act.
Coupled with the exclusion of ads based on past matters, the focus on
persons able to act in an official capacity eliminates vast quantities of
the issue ads discussed in considerable detail by the McConnell district
court, and disclosure eliminates other problems. However, in the 2002
FEC rulemaking on electioneering communications, OMB Watch, a
nonprofit government watchdog group, noted that sometimes there is
a need to "urge[] the public to contact a state legislator, [m]ayor or
governor who also happens to be challenging a Member of Congress in
a primary or general election."1 3 Citizen groups should have the same
right to grassroots-lobby such challengers as they would a "Member of
Congress" or an "incumbent,"1" 4 so such terminology should be omit-
ted from the test.18
5
Some additional test elements suggested in various proposed rules
are: (1) whether a candidate may be named (as opposed to requiring
the substitution of a reference such as "your Congressman"); (2)
whether and how a legislator's position on the issue may be stated; (3)
whether and how contact information for the legislator must be pro-
vided; and (4) whether there should be a separate PASO element.
These test elements are considered seriatim.
1. Concealing Officials' Names
By definition, an electioneering communication "refers to a
clearly identified candidate for Federal office."'" 6  In the 2002
rulemaking, the FEC defined "[r]efers to a clearly identified candidate"
as including "an unambiguous reference such as 'the President,' 'your
183. Letter from Kay Guinane to Mai T. Dinh at 4 (Aug. 21, 2002) (OMB Watch
comments on FEC rulemaking on electioneering communications).
184. See infra p. 408 (Appendix) ("Member of Congress" in FEC proposed
Alternative 3-A), p.411 ("incumbent" in Broad-Coalition Test).
185. The 2002 rulemaking comments prove again that broad debate on the wording
of a rule focuses the issues and improves the final product (assuming the comments
are heeded and there actually is a product). The authors had hoped that when the U.S.
Supreme Court in WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (2006), remanded the case for consideration
on the merits, the FEC (and intervening prime sponsors) would engage in the debate
on the proper wording for an exemption. However, the defendants refused, choosing
instead to resist an exemption. The Broad Coalition Rule demonstrated again how an
ongoing conversation over the scope of a rule improves the product. It was a very well-
considered proposal that was clearly designed to relieve any realistic concerns about
an exemption affecting elections and to be a rule that the FEC might actually adopt.
186. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. IV 2004).
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Congressman,' or 'the incumbent. ' 18 7 Therefore, unless a communica-
tion references a candidate, it is not an electioneering communication.
And if there is to be a test stating an as-applied grassroots lobbying
exemption, then the test necessarily begins with the fact that the com-
munication will reference a federal candidate within the prohibition
periods, among other factors, or else there would be no issue.
All rule proposals to date, save the Prime Sponsors Rule, assume
that a grassroots lobbying communication will name the persons who
are the object of the grassroots lobbying effort. But the Prime Spon-
sors Rule would require that "the communication refer[ I to the candi-
date only by use of the term 'Your Congressman,' 'Your Senator,' 'Your
Member of Congress' or a similar reference and . . .not include the
name or likeness of the candidate in any form, including as part of an
Internet address."' 88
At the oral argument before the Supreme Court in WRTL I, the
Solicitor General argued that a corporation could evade the prohibition
by simply "avoiding making an express reference to the candidate,
which ought not to be too difficult if you're really just engaged in issue
advocacy.... ."19 Justice Scalia immediately denied that it was easy to
do grassroots lobbying without naming names.190 Justice O'Connor
asked, "Could they have said in the ad, call your elected representa-
tives, not naming any names?" General Clement responded, "They also
could have done that."' 9 ' But WRTL could not have done that because
the FEC's regulations prohibit the substitution of "any unambiguous
references such as 'the President,' 'your Congressman,' or 'the incum-
bent"' for the incumbent's name.'9 2 So in the Wedding Ad' 9 3 WRTL
187. 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(2) (2007).
188. See infra pp. 408-09 (Appendix).
189. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-
1581).
190. Justice Scalia responded, "I deny ... that it's easy to do issue ads without
naming the candidate." Id. "The ... point of an issue ad is to put pressure on ... the
candidate that you want to vote your way," he continued. Id. He concluded that
"[wlithout ... telling people to call ... the office of that incumbent, you're not doing
very much." Id.
191. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (No. 04-1581). He
immediately went on to argue that the fact that WRTL "couldn't resist the temptation
to link the filibuster issue to Senator Feingold [wa]s not that surprising" and was
interrupted at that point by Chief Justice Roberts: "That may be because the people
who were doing the filibuster were the Senators. It's not ... a surprising thing to link
the Senators to that issue." Id.
192. 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(2) (2007). The FEC regulation would even ban use of
"Contact your Senators..." because that would still be "any unambiguous reference"
(which is prohibited) and encompassed by the prohibited phrase "your Congressman"
[Vol. 29:353390
38
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss3/1
DISTINGUISHING "GENUINE" FROM "SHAM"
could not have run its ads by replacing "Contact Senators Feingold and
Kohl and tell them to oppose the filibuster"1 94 with "Contact Senator
Kohl and your other Senator and tell them .... 195
Under the Prime Sponsors Rule, however, WRTL could have run
the ad by substituting "'Your Senator' . .. or a similar reference" for
Senator Feingold's name.196 So, WRTL's Wedding Ad would have been
permissible under that rule if it had simply substituted Feingold's title
for his name. The Prime Sponsors Rule brings the analysis to a fine
point. If clearly identifying a candidate by title creates no functional
equivalence to express advocacy, does simply informing citizens of
their lawmaker's name suddenly create functional equivalence? Does
depriving the public of public information prevent functional equiva-
lence? Is it even possible for such a title-for-name dictate to reduce
functional equivalence if the PBA Ad Test already reflects an ad that
did name a candidate and yet had no cognizable electoral effect
because it was a recognized "genuine issue ad"?
Narrow tailoring requires a "nexus" (a non-tenuous, relevant
link)197 between the asserted compelling interest and the restriction
and an examination of whether the "interest asserted by the Govern-
ment is . . . substantially advanced" by the prohibition. 98 Since
McConnell upheld the prohibition facially,1 99 it has a general nexus to,
and advancement of, the corporate-form interest and a substantial
number of ads captured by the prohibition are "the functional
equivalent of express advocacy. '"200 But are these "nexus" and
"advancement" requirements met by withholding a lawmaker's name?
The WRTL II district court found the necessary nexus in the "link"
between an ad's words and the lawmaker's fitness for office:
(and would be even less ambiguous because there are only two Senators while
Wisconsin has eight Representatives).
193. See infra pp. 402-03 (Appendix).
194. The presence of this phrase demonstrates that the Solicitor General was also
wrong when he responded to Justice Scalia that WRTL "didn't even do that" in
response to the Justice's comment that unless you "tell[ ] people to call the office of
that incumbent, you're not doing very much." Transcript of Oral Argument at 37,
WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (No. 04-1581).
195. The Solicitor General acknowledged correctly that Senator Kohl could be
named because he was not a candidate. Id. at 39.
196. See infra pp. 408-09 (Appendix).
197. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 793 & n.7 (1988).
198. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 388 (1984).
199. 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003).
200. Id.
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The common denominator between express advocacy and its func-
tional equivalent, as the Supreme Court defined it in McConnell, is the
link between the words and images used in the ad and the fitness, or
lack thereof, of the candidate for public office. [n.22] Indeed, it is that
very link which evinces, on the face of the ad, the intent to influence
the election that the McConnell Court imposed as a critical require-
ment to functional equivalency. Conversely, it is the absence of that
link that enables an issue ad to be fairly regarded as a genuine issue ad.
[n.22] See McConnell, 251F. Supp. 2d at 796 (Leon, J.) ("It is the
absence of a link between the advocacy of an issue and a candi-
date's fitness, or lack thereof, for election that renders congres-
sional intervention with respect to genuine issue ads . . .
unconstitutional."). 20 1
And the district court noted that a missing link meant missing
corruption:
More importantly, it is the absence of that link which obviates the like-
lihood of political corruption and public cynicism in government
where the ad, on its face, is devoid of any language the purpose of
which is advocacy either for or against a particular candidate for fed-
eral office. Thus, while it may be theoretically possible to craft a genu-
ine issue ad so subtly that it subconsciously encourages (or
discourages) a potential voter to support a political candidate, there is
no evidentiary or common sense basis to believe that such facially neu-
tral ads are necessarily intended to affect an election, or will necessarily
be viewed as such.20 2
The only reference to Sen. Feingold in WRTL's anti-filibuster ads
was in the closing call to his constituents to contact him and ask him
to oppose the filibusters. As Judge Leon noted in McConnell, even the
defendants' own expert concluded that an ad mentioning a candidate's
name is a genuine issue ad, if "the body of the ad has no referent to [a
candidate] whatsoever [and] the only referent to [the candidate] is the
call line. '20 3 Naming the candidate is necessary to grassroots lobby-
ing, as Judge Leon noted from the McConnell record.20 4 Grassroots
201. WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 209 (D.D.C. 2006).
202. Id. at 209-10 (emphasis in original).
203. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supl. 2d 176, 795 (D.D.C. 2003).
204. Judge Leon singled out grassroots lobbying as being of special concern,
providing a rationale from the record as to why it is necessary to name a legislator in
such situations: "[t]he testimony of various plaintiffs' witnesses indicates that, in their
experience, there are many reasons why it is helpful, if not necessary, to mention a
candidate's name in these advertisements in order to focus the public's attention on a
particular pending piece of legislation." Id. at 794. For example, bills are named after
sponsors. Id. "'[C]andidates may be prominent people whose support or opposition
to a bill or policy may have important persuasive effect."' Id. (citation omitted) "'[I]f
[Vol. 29:353
40
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss3/1
DISTINGUISHING "GENUINE" FROM "SHAM"
lobbying is ineffective without telling constituents to whom their call
should be made. Often only one or two members of Congress in a
state have a position on legislation that differs from others and so
would be the object of grassroots lobbying. And many citizens do not
know the names of their members of Congress. Thus, they would not
know whom to call, and some would hesitate to call a switchboard and
acknowledge this ignorance. So, requiring ads to either say, "Call your
Senator," or that direct listeners to a switchboard greatly reduces the
effectiveness of grass-lobbying.20 5
A title-for-name dictate also reduces the amount of information
that citizens receive, which runs counter to First Amendment values.
Moreover, it violates the hearers' right to receive information, and
deprives the people, who are the real sovereigns and are being called
upon to exercise that sovereignty, of vital information needed to fulfill
their civic function in our system of government. Depriving the people
of important information even runs counter to a purported purpose of
campaign finance reform legislation, which is to increase the relevant
information available to citizens. Given the protections already in
place in the PBA Ad Test, there is no nexus between a title-for-name
dictate and any interest in protecting the integrity of our system of gov-
ernment when the dictate undercuts the very core functioning of that
system. The dictate does not substantially advance any interest, but
rather it impedes the people's exercise of their constitutional rights
and their participation in self-government. Consequently, it fails the
functional equivalence test and strict scrutiny.
2. Concealing Officials' Positions
Does adding a requirement that the incumbent's record or posi-
tion on the matter that is the subject of the petitioning be concealed
from the people in a grassroots lobbying communication survive strict
an issue ad is used to explain why a legislative position of a particular Member of
Congress is good for his or her district or state, the member generally must be
mentioned. The same is true if the purpose of the ad may be to induce viewers to contact
the Member and communicate a policy position."' Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original). "[I1t is often necessary to refer to a federal candidate by name because '[t]he
express or implied urging of viewers or listeners to contact the policymaker regarding
[an] issue is ... especially effective by showing them how they can personally impact
the issue debate in question."' Id. (citation omitted).
205. At the WRTL I oral argument, Justice Kennedy said, "It's such an odd calculus.
Who is the person more likely to be influenced with an issue ad?" Transcript of Oral
Argument at 40, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-1581). "And that's... the one
area where the ad is prohibited," he added. Id. The Solicitor General conceded the
point as to effectiveness: "Obviously, you're right ..." Id.
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scrutiny? None of the three ads that WRTL attached as exhibits to its
complaint stated the position of Senators Kohl or Feingold on filibus-
ters,2°6 but the CCPA Ad for which WRTL sought relief in 2006 did
so,2 07 as did the proposed Crossroads Ad in the CCLM case. 20 8 The
Prime Sponsors Rule 20 9 and the Commissioner Thomas Rule 2 10 pro-
scribe any reference to "the candidate's record or position on any
issue." The Broad Coalition Rule would permit such a reference "[i]f
... it does so only by quoting the candidate's own public statements or
reciting the candidate's official action, such as a vote, on the mat-
ter."'2 1 1 The PBA Ad, the gold-standard genuine issue ad, stated the
Senators' position, 2 12 so the PBA Ad Test adopts the position that a
statement about the lawmaker's record or position on the issue is per-
missible, but it does include language about the nature of the state-
ment in the PBA Ad (somewhat along the lines of the Broad Coalition
Rule) that assures objective fairness and eliminates or reduces con-
cerns about affecting elections.
Employing the same analysis as already established with regard to
the title-for-name dictate, the issue is whether the safeguards already
built into the PBA Ad Test so diminish any serious possibility that a
grassroots lobbying ad might have a cognizable effect on an election
that a position-concealment dictate can survive strict scrutiny. As with
concealing the incumbent official's name, concealing the incumbent's
position burdens the people's right to receive information and their
self-governing ability. It reduces the amount of information available
to the public, thus running counter to First Amendment values and a
purported purpose of campaign finance reform legislation. In fact,
knowing a legislator's position on the issue is especially vital both to a
citizen's decision whether to call a legislator and the citizen's prepara-
tion of what to say if he or she decides to call. Upon learning the
incumbent's position, the citizen may decide not to call because he or
she agrees with the position taken and does not believe that there is a
need to firm up the official's commitment to the position. If the citizen
decides to call, he or she may wish to first research and marshal argu-
ments in order to effectively petition the official (either to alter or
206. See infra pp. 402-04 (Appendix).
207. See infra p. 405 (Appendix).
208. See infra p. 405 (Appendix).
209. See infra pp. 408-09 (Appendix).
210. See infra p. 410 (Appendix).
211. See infra p. 411 (Appendix).
212. See infra p. 401 (Appendix) ("Your Senators, Russ Feingold and Herb Kohl
voted to continue this grizzly [sic] procedure.")
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retain the stated position). Depending on the gravity of the issue and
the official's position on it, the citizen will decide whether to email,
phone, write, or try to see the lawmaker in person. Keeping citizens in
the dark as to their representatives' position on important public
issues makes all of these self-governing tasks more difficult.
It is true that misrepresenting an incumbent's vote or position on
an issue would hinder the people in their self-governing task, but that
issue is about how to deal with possible misrepresentations, not about
the permissibility of concealing the position of the people's representa-
tives on public issues from the people themselves. Those problems
exist equally outside of electioneering communication prohibition
periods, so they provide no basis for a prohibition in periods before
elections. There are less-restrictive means of dealing with misrepresen-
tations than a prohibition, including the means provided in the PBA
Ad Test2 13 and the Broad Coalition Rule.214 If the risk of misrepresen-
tation in public debate constitutionally permits prohibition of that
debate, then the prohibition is woefully underinclusive and Congress
would be permitted to ban all public debate. But that would not be the
America that the Framers bequeathed to us. And the people's repre-
sentatives are supposed to be accountable to the people, so there is
absolutely no justification for any representative of the people to avoid
accountability to the people for his or her record or position. Incum-
bents should not be able to shield themselves, their records, or their
position on upcoming legislative or executive branch actions from
their constituents at the most vital times. The First Amendment pro-
tects robust public debate, not an incumbent-protection gag rule that
permits politicians to hide from the sovereign people.
Finally, disclosure of an incumbent politician's imminent planned
public policy decisions is about legislative and executive branch action
right now, not whether that lawmaker should be a lawmaker next
term. One might ardently support the official for reelection but be
vehemently opposed to his or her present position on a particular mat-
ter. Or, one might have no position on a candidate's reelection but
support his or her action on a particular issue, which was the case with
the CCPA Ad that WRTL wanted to run in the fall of 2006.215 So, the
necessary nexus between a position-concealment dictate and protect-
213. See supra p. 401.
214. See infra p. 411 (Appendix).
215. See infra p. 405 (Appendix). WRTL approved Sen. Kohl's prior vote on the
Child Custody Protection Act, although it had no position on his candidacy. See Third
Aff. of Barbara L. Lyons at 7, WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 04-
1260).
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ing elections is missing. There is no functional equivalence, and,
therefore, this dictate fails strict scrutiny.
3. Dictating Contact Information
Does strict scrutiny justify allowing government to dictate that a
communication contain certain contact information? One of the four
alternatives set out by the FEC for comment in its 2002 rulemaking
required that the grassroots lobbying communication "[c]ontain[ ] a
phone number, toll free number, mail address, or electronic mail
address, internet home page or other world wide web address for the
person or entity that the ad urges the viewer or listener to contact." '216
But none of the other three alternatives propounded by the FEC, the
Prime Sponsors Rule,2 17 the Commissioner Thomas Rule, 2 18 nor the
Broad Coalition Rule, 2 19 contained such a dictate as to detail. 2 20 The
PBA Ad, the Crossroads Ad, WRTL's 2006 Filibuster Radio Ad, and the
CCPA Ad provided the U.S. Capitol Switchboard phone number.221
WRTL's 2004 anti-filibuster ads pointed recipients to a website 222 that
provided contact information for the Senators (and included the abil-
ity to send an email directly to the Senators and provided more infor-
mation on the judicial filibuster problem) and was chosen because it
was more memorable than a number.223
The idea of requiring specific contact information doubtless came
from the fact that "sham" ads in the McConnell record often lacked
such information. 224 But Judge Leon in his McConnell Findings identi-
fied representative "genuine issue ads" in the record that were captured
by the prohibition, with three of the six ads having no phone number
or other contact information.225 Therefore, providing a phone number
cannot be determinative. While providing contact information is help-
216. See infra p. 408 (Appendix) (Alternative 3-C).
217. See infra pp. 408-09 (Appendix).
218. See infra p. 410 (Appendix).
219. See infra p. 411 (Appendix).
220. The Center for Responsive Politics comments, authored by Larry Noble and
Paul Stanford, rejected the requirement of specific contact information: "We ...
believe that using phone numbers ... as one of the criteria ... will invite attempts to
use these elements to inoculate communications from BCRA's coverage." CRP
Comments, supra note 171 at 6.
221. See infra p. 405 (Appendix).
222. See infra pp. 402-04 (Appendix).
223. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-6, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-
1581) (statement of James Bopp, Jr.).
224. An example is the Yellowtail Ad. See infra p. 402 (Appendix).
225. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 195-96 (D.D.C. 2003) (AFL-CIO's
"Call" ad); id. at 916 (AFL-CIO's "Spearmint" ad), 917 (AFL-CIO's "Label" ad).
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ful and may be in the communicator's interest, it is not the role of
government to tell citizens how best to communicate: "The First
Amendment protects [WRTL's] right not only to advocate [it's] cause
but also to select what [it] believe[s] to be the most effective means for
doing so."2 2' The government has no per se interest in increasing the
amount or dictating an exact type of information that would justify
requiring communicators to list any particular contact details. And
the government has no interest that would justify telling WRTL that it
must provide a phone number in its ads as opposed to providing a
website that provides even more contact information and even permits
the viewer to send an email to the legislators from within the website.
Finally, there is no "link" between mandated contact details and a
candidate's fitness for office. There is no nexus to protecting our elec-
toral system and no functional equivalence to express advocacy
involved. Thus, this dictate fails strict scrutiny.
4. A PASO Requirement
BCRA permitted the FEC to make a rule exempting communica-
tions from the electioneering communication prohibition provided
that no exempted communication "promotes or supports ... or attacks
or opposes a candidate" (collectively "PASO").227 In one proposal set
out by the FEC in its 2002 rulemaking, the FEC actually imported
PASO language, requiring that the call to contact a legislator be done
"without promoting, supporting, attacking or opposing the candi-
date. 228 In late 2006, FEC Commissioner Hans von Spakosvsky's pro-
posed an interim rule2 29 that followed the Broad Coalition Rule2 30 very
closely but added PASO language, apparently in an effort to persuade a
reluctant FEC to adopt an interim rule. Of course, no court is bound
by BCRA's PASO restriction, so that standard would not govern a test
stated in a holding or a new FEC rule based on that holding.
226. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988).
227. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(iv) (Supp. IV 2004). Representative Shays discussed the
reason for this rulemaking authority on the house floor, noting that "it is possible that
there could be communications that will fall within [the prohibition] even though they
are plainly and unquestionably not related to the election" and the rulemaking
authority permitted the FEC to exempt "such communication ... because they are
wholly unrelated to an election." 148 CONG. REC. H401-11 (Feb. 13, 2002).
228. See infra p. 408 (Appendix) (FEC Proposed Rules for Comment, Alternative 3-
A).
229. See infra pp. 411-12 (Appendix) (Commissioner von Spakovsky Rule).
230. See infra p. 410 (Appendix).
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The problem with PASO language is its vagueness.23 McConnell
upheld PASO language against a vagueness attack, but only in the lim-
ited context of political parties and politicians (who supposedly have
higher skills in separating PASO from non-PASO language),232 not as
to other entities. If included in a test for a grassroots lobbying exemp-
tion, it would be applied even to diminutive, unsophisticated advocacy
groups. Its vagueness would chill the people's speech as they try to
exercise their self-governing role by petitioning government officials.
Strict scrutiny burdens are not met by introducing vagueness. In fact,
one of the arguments that the Solicitor General made in the WRTL I
oral argument was that, in creating the prohibition, Congress had "to
regulate in a way that's not vague, that's not overbroad, but is not so
under-inclusive that it can be easily evaded. ' 233 A properly-worded test
eliminates the prohibition's overbreadth and avoids easy evasion with-
out a PASO test. A communication created under the PBA Ad Test
would not PASO, but it would accomplish that goal by the test's terms
and not by introducing vague PASO language. PASO language is not
needed to prevent functional equivalence because there are less-vague,
less-restrictive, and less-chilling ways to do so.
231. There was universal agreement among commentators addressing the issue in
the 2002 FEC rulemaking (BCRA Prime Sponsors, AFL-CIO, CMLC, Common Cause
& Democracy 21, and Independent Sector) that PASO language in a rule providing a
grassroots lobbying exemption would raise serious constitutional problems of
vagueness. See, e.g., Detailed Comments of BCRA Sponsors Sen. John McCain, Sen. Russ
Feingold, Rep. Christopher Shays, Rep. Marty Meehan, Sen. Olympia Snowe, and Sen.
James Jeffords at 8 (2002), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/electioneering-
comm/comments/uscongmembers.pdf (using PASO directly in a grassroots
lobbying exemption would undercut the goal of avoiding any "subjective test" in favor
of a "bright line test"); Letter from Laurence E. Gold and Michael B. Trister to Mai T.
Dinh at 13 (Aug. 29, 2002) (AFL-CIO); Letter from Glen Shor to Mai T. Dinh at 9 (Aug.
21, 2002) (Campaign and Media Legal' Center) (arguing that PASO language
eliminates necessary "bright-line guidance" and is only suitable for "informing
inherently electioneering entities (i.e., parties and candidates)"); Letter from Donald J.
Simon to Mai T. Dinh at 11 (Aug. 22, 2002) (Common Cause & Democracy 21);
Comments of Independent Sector on the Proposed Rules Regarding Electioneering
Communications (Notice 2002-13) at 4 (attached to Letter from Sara Melendez to Mai
T. Dihn (Aug. 21, 2002)).
232. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 170 n.64 (2003) (PASO not vague as to
political parties); id. at 184 (PASO not vague as to incumbent state or local politicians
or candidates).
233. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-
1581).
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CONCLUSION
The central question in creating a test is whether an ad focuses on
incumbents in their role as legislators (or executive officials) or in their
role as candidates. The WRTL II district court identified this key ques-
tion with its "link between the words and images used in the ad and
the fitness, or lack thereof, of the candidate for public office."234 The
petitioners proposing the Broad Spectrum Rule also analyzed McCon-
nell in their rulemaking petition and concluded that "McConnell sug-
gests . . . that a particular 'electioneering communication' is the
'functional equivalent of express advocacy," and, therefore, constitu-
tionally subject to regulation, if it both pertains to an individual's can-
didacy or an election and seeks to persuade a voter to make a
particular voting decision with respect to that candidate."235
When incumbent legislators choose to both run for reelection and
remain in session during peak legislative seasons, they wear both hats,
as do incumbent executives who seek reelection. Genuine grassroots
lobbying focuses on incumbent politicians in their official capacity,
not as candidates, by focusing on asking constituents to contact these
officials about current matters relating to official duties. And the PBA
Ad Test readily distinguishes "genuine" from "sham" issue ads in the
grassroots lobbying context.
234. WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 209 (D.D.C. 2006).
235. Jan Witold Baran, Robert F. Bauer, Laurence E. Gold, Margaret E. McCormick
& John Pomerantz, Petition for Rulemaking: Electioneering Communication and
Grassroots Lobbying Exemption at 3 (Feb. 16, 2006), available at http://www.fec.gov/
pdf/nprm/lobbying/orig-petition.pdf.
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ADVERTISEMENTS
PBA Ad (Feingold Kohl Abortion 60 Ad)
This ad was recognized by McConnell defense expert Kenneth M.
Goldstein as a "genuine issue ad":
236
America was outraged when two New Jersey teenagers checked into a
Delaware hotel and delivered and exposed [sic] of their newborn baby
in a dumpster. Most Americans couldn't believe that this defenseless
human life could be so coldly snuffed out. But incredibly, if a doctor
had been present that day in Delaware and delivered the infant, all but
one inch from full birth and then killed him it would have been per-
fectly legal. Instead of murder or manslaughter, it would have been
called a partial-birth abortion. Killing late in the third trimester, killing
just inches away from full birth. Partial-birth abortion puts a violent
death on thousands of babies every year. Your Senators, Russ Feingold
and Herb Kohl voted to continue this grizzly [sic] procedure. Contact
Senators Feingold and Kohl today and insist they change their vote and
oppose partial birth abortion. Their number in Washington is 202-
224-3121.237
Barker Ad
This ad was recognized by McConnell defense expert David
Magleby as a "genuine issue ad" and was cited and quoted in Judge
Leon's McConnell opinion as a "representative example" of a "genuine
issue ad":
238
Paid for by the Working Men and Women of the AFL-CIO. [Barker
speaking]: Okay ladies and gents, step right up and see if you can fol-
low the ball. Is it here? Is it there? Where could it be? [Voice over]:
They're playing games again in Washington. Without discussion or
debate, they're planning another vote on the controversial Fast Track
law-special powers to ram through trade deals like NAFTA. Fast Track
failed last year because working families don't want more trade deals
that put big corporations first; deals that ignore our concerns about
lost jobs; environmental problems on our borders, and dangerous,
imported foods. But Newt Gingrich and the sponsors of Fast Track
hope they can sneak it by this fall, while public attention is focused on
other issues. [Barker speaking]: Keep your eyes on the ball now . ..
[Voice over]: Call Representative _ at xxx-xxx-xxxx and tell him to
236. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 312 (D.D.C. 2003) (Henderson, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 748 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), 905 (Leon, J.).
237. Id. at 312 (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
238. Id. at 795, 914-15 (Leon, J.).
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vote no on Fast Track. Tell him we're still paying attention. And Fast
Track is still a bad idea.
239
Yellowtail Ad
This ad was cited by the Supreme Court in McConnell as an exam-
ple of a sham issue ad, "clearly intended to influence the election":
240
'Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values but took a swing at
his wife. And Yellowtail's response? He only slapped her. But "her nose
was not broken." He talks law and order ... but is himself a convicted
felon. And though he talks about protecting children, Yellowtail failed
to make his own child support payments-then voted against child
support enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support family
values.' 5 1998 Senate Report 6305 (minority views).24 1
WRTL's 2004 Wedding Ad
In WRTL II, the district court held the electioneering communica-
tion unconstitutional as applied to this radio ad that WRTL wanted to
continue broadcasting into the electioneering prohibition period in
2004:242
Audio: We hear church bells up and under...
PASTOR: And who gives this woman to be married to this man?
BRIDE'S FATHER (rambling): Well, as father of the bride, I certainly
could. But instead, I'd like to share a few tips on how to properly install
drywall. Now you put the drywall up ...
VOICE-OVER: Sometimes it's just not fair to delay an important
decision.
But in Washington it's happening. A group of Senators is using the
filibuster delay tactic to block federal judicial nominees from a simple.
"yes" or "no" vote. So qualified candidates don't get a chance to serve.
Yes, it's politics at work, causing gridlock and backing up some of our
courts to a state of emergency.
BRIDE'S FATHER (rambling): Then you get your joint compound and
your joint tape and put the tape up over ...
Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the
filibuster.
Visit: BeFair.org. That's BeFair.org
239. Id. at 795, 915 (Leon, J.) (emphasis added). See also id. at 915-18 (five other
"representative examples of genuine issue ads").
240. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 & n.78 (2003).
241. Id. at 193 n.78.
242. WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 210 (D.D.C. 2006).
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Paid for by Wisconsin Right to Life (befair.org), which is responsible
for the content of this advertising and not authorized by any candidate
243or candidate's committee.
WRTL's 2004 Loan Ad
In WRTL II, the district court held the electioneering communica-
tion unconstitutional as applied to this radio ad that WRTL wanted to
broadcast in 2004:244
LOAN OFFICER: Welcome Mr. and Mrs. Shulman. We've reviewed
your loan application, along with your credit report, the appraisal on
the house, the inspections, and well..
COUPLE: Yes, yes . . . we're listening.
OFFICER: Well, it all reminds me of a time I went fishing with my
father. We were on the Wolf River Waupaca ...
VOICE-OVER: Sometimes it's just not fair to delay an important
decision.
But in Washington it's happening. A group of Senators is using the
filibuster delay tactic to block federal judicial nominees from a simple
"yes" or "no" vote. So qualified candidates aren't getting a chance to
serve.
It's politics at work, causing gridlock and backing up some of our
courts to a state of emergency.
Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the
filibuster.
Visit: BeFair.org
Paid for by Wisconsin Right to Life (befair.org), which is responsible
for the content of this advertising and not authorized by any candidate
or candidate's committee.2 45
WRTL's 2004 Waiting Ad
In WRTL II, the district court held the electioneering communica-
tion unconstitutional as applied to this television ad that WRTL
wanted to broadcast in 2004:246
VOICE-OVER: There are a lot of judicial nominees out there who can't
go to work. Their careers are put on hold because a group of Senators
is filibustering-blocking qualified nominees from a simple "yes" or
"no" vote.
It's politics at work and it's causing gridlock.
243. Id. at 200 n.3.
244. Id. at 210.
245. Id. at 200 n.4.
246. Id. at 210.
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Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the
filibuster.
Visit: BeFair.org
WRTL REPRESENTATIVE VOICE-OVER: Wisconsin Right to Life is
responsible for the content of this advertising.
The script describes the visual aspect of the advertisement as follows:
We see vignettes of a middle-aged man being as productive as possible
while his professional life is in limbo:
He reads the morning paper
He polishes his shoes
He checks for mail, which hasn't arrived
He scans through his Rolodex
He reads his Palm Pilot manual
He pays bills.
At the end of the ad, the website "www.BeFair.org" is displayed, and a
four-second disclaimer reads "Paid for by Wisconsin Right to Life
(befair.org), which is responsible for the content of this advertisement,
not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee." '247
WRTL's 2006 Filibuster Radio Ad
In January 2006, WRTL ran this "Filibuster Radio Ad: 60" oppos-
ing a threatened filibuster of now-Justice Samuel Alito (note this was
not run during a prohibition period and so was not an electioneering
communication): 24 8
Some Senators are at it again. Threatening to filibuster qualified judi-
cial nominees. This time, the stakes are even higher. They want to use
the filibuster to block a vote on the nomination of Judge Samuel Alito
for the U.S. Supreme Court. Judge Alito has received the highest quali-
fication rating for judicial nominees and deserves a simple "yes" or
"no" vote to prevent gridlock in our judicial system. Contact Senators
Feingold and Kohl at 202-224-3121 and tell them to oppose the filibus-
ter of Judge Samuel Alito for the U.S. Supreme Court. That's 202-224-
3121. Paid for by Wisconsin Right to Life, which is responsible for the
content of this advertising and not authorized by any candidate or can-
didate's committee.2 4 9
247. Id. at 200 n.5
248. Second Aft. of Barbara L. Lyons at 1, WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (No. 04-
1260).
249. Id.
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WRTL's CCPA Ad
WRTL sought a preliminary injunction during the 2006 prohibi-
tion period as part of its ongoing WRTL litigation to permit it to run
this "Child Custody Protection Act Ad: 60 Seconds," but a preliminary
injunction was denied, and the district court in the WRTL II opinion
chose to rule only on the three 2004 anti-filibuster ads:
250
Listen up, parents. Wisconsin requires parental consent before your
minor daughter can have an abortion. But, she can be taken to Illinois
for an abortion that is kept secret from you. Imagine, your daughter
can be taken across state lines for a major surgical procedure without
your knowledge or consent. The U.S. Senate recently passed a bill to
protect parents from secret abortions. Fortunately, Senator Kohl voted
for the rights of parents. But, sadly, Senator Feingold did not. Your
help is urgently needed because some Senators are holding up further
action on the bill. Please call Senators Kohl and Feingold at 202-224-
3121 and urge them to stop efforts by the Senate Democratic leader-
ship to hold up a bill which will prevent secret abortions. That's 202-
224-3121. Paid for by Wisconsin Right to Life, which is responsible for
the content of this advertising and not authorized by any candidate or
candidate's committee.251
CCLM'S 2004 Crossroads Ad
CCLM sought judicial protection to run this ad, but a preliminary
injunction was denied and the case dismissed for mootness:
Our country stands at the crossroads-at the intersection of how mar-
riage will be defined for future generations. Marriage between a man
and a woman has been challenged across this country and could be
declared unconstitutional at any time by rogue judges. We must safe-
guard the traditional definition of marriage by putting it beyond the
reach of all judges - by writing it into the U.S. Constitution. Unfortu-
nately, your senators voted against the Marriage Protection Amend-
ment two years ago. Please call Sens. Snowe and Collins immediately
and urge them to support the Marriage Protection Amendment when it
comes to a vote in early June. Call the Capitol switchboard at 202-224-
3121 and ask for your senators. Again, that's 202-224-3121. Thank you
for making your voice heard. Paid for by the Christian Civic League of
Maine, which is responsible for the content of this advertising and not
authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee.252
250. See WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 203 n.15 (mentioning CCPA Ad).
251. Third Aff. of Barbara L. Lyons at Exhibit D, WRTL II, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (No.
04-1260).
252. See Jurisdictional Statement at 1 n. 1, Christian Civic League of Me., Inc. v. FEC
(U.S. Supreme Court No. 06-589).
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TESTS
WRTL's Test in WRTL I Oral Argument
At the oral argument in WRTL I, James Bopp, Jr. offered the fol-
lowing test for identifying a genuine issue ad employed for grassroots
lobbying:
I think that you would look at, one whether the . . .ad discusses a
current legislative issue; two, whether or not it made any reference to
the legislator beyond lobbying him or her about that specific issue. So
there should not be any references to the election or the candidacy of
the incumbent or any of those type of references. And if you had that,
you would have a bona fide, genuine effort to lobby.2 53
WRTL's Test in WRTL I Briefing
In briefing WRTL I, WRTL set out the following guidelines for
identifying a genuine issue ad employed for grassroots lobbying:
[T]he IRS definition of "grass roots lobbying communication" . . . is
"any attempt to influence any legislation through an attempt to affect
the opinions of the general public or any segment thereof " and has
three "required elements": (1) "refers to specific legislation," (2)
"reflects a view on such legislation," and (3) "encourages the recipient
of the communication to take some action with respect to such legisla-
tion." 26 C.F.R. § 56.4911-2(b)(2)(i)-(ii). Since a general grassroots
lobbying exception should apply to both legislative and executive
branch actions, this should be made clear in any rule. Further, to pre-
vent any risk of an attempt to influence an election, a grassroots lobby-
ing communication should not mention the pending election, the
incumbent politician's candidacy, or the identity of any challenger.
This would provide a workable definition for grassroots lobbying and
avoid McConnell's concerns about "sham issue ads." 254
WRTL's "Details" Concerning Its 2004 Ads (not a test)
In its WRTL I briefing WRTL set out the following "details" con-
cerning its ads, which were stated not as a test but as demonstrating
that (under any proper test) these ads had sufficient indicia of a genu-
ine issue ad that the electioneering communication prohibition was
unconstitutional as applied to them:
The details of WRTL's broadcast ads indicate that they were authentic
grassroots lobbying and not electioneering. As to topic, they concerned
253. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-
1581).
254. Reply Brief for Appellants at 18-19, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (No. 04-1581).
[Vol. 29:353406
54
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss3/1
DISTINGUISHING "GENUINE" FROM "SHAM"
only a legislative matter that was specific and dealt with an issue in
which WRTL had a clear and long-held interest. As to timing, the legis-
lative action was under active consideration by the Senate then in ses-
sion; the filibuster problem was coming to a head at the time; the
timing was beyond the control of the communicator; and the ads were
run outside the prohibition period as well as being planned to run
within it. As to candidate reference, the only reference to a clearly-iden-
tified federal candidate was a statement urging the public to contact
the candidate and to ask that he take a particular position on the legis-
lative matter; the ads contained a link to contact information for the
Senators (by reference to a website); and the ads identified two incum-
bent Senators, only one of which was up for election, and referred to
the candidate and non-candidate equally. As to tone, the ads contained
no reference to any political party, to the candidate's record or position
on any issue, to the candidate's character, qualifications, or fitness for
office, or to the candidate's election or candidacy; and they contained
no words that promoted, supported, attacked, or opposed the candi-
date. In addition, they could have been run only with money from a
"segregated bank account" under 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(E) (only dona-
tions from qualified individuals) if necessary to obtain injunctive
relief. Record 30:9-10 (AVC 9[1 38-50). The ads were broadcast inde-
pendent of any candidate or political party. Record 30:10 (AVC 9[ 50)
(see 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a)). These details demonstrate that, under any
reasonable test, the ads were genuine grassroots lobbying.
215
WRTL II District Court Test
The district court in WRTL II set out a general test for distinguish-
ing "genuine" from "sham" that may be distilled as follows: (1)
examine the text and images of the electioneering communication
itselF 56 and (2) ask whether there is a "link" between the communica-
tion's contents and the fitness of the identified candidate for office.2 57
255. Brief for Appellant at 4 n.4, WRTL 1, 546 U.S. 410 (emphasis in original).
256. 466 F. Supp. 2d at 205. The Court indicated that in determining whether an ad
is functionally equivalent to express advocacy it would examine whether it, "at a
minimum":
(1) describes a legislative issue that is either currently the subject of
legislative scrutiny or likely to be the subject of such scrutiny in the near
future; (2) refers to the prior voting record or current position of the named
candidate on the issue described; (3) exhorts the listener to do anything
other than contact the candidate about the described issue; (4) promotes,
attacks, supports, or opposes the named candidate; and (5) refers to the
upcoming election, candidacy, and/or political party of the candidate.
Id. at 207.
257. Id. at 209.
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FEC Rules Proposed for Comment
In its 2002 rulemaking on electioneering communications, the
FEC solicited comments on the following four alternatives:
Alternative 3-A: (6) Is devoted exclusively to urging support for or
opposition to particular pending legislative or executive matters, where
the communication only requests recipients to contact a specific Mem-
ber of Congress or public official, without promoting, supporting,
attacking or opposing the candidate, or indicating the candidate's past
or current position on the legislation;
Alternative 3-B: (6) Concerns only a pending legislative or executive
matter, and the only reference to a Federal candidate is a brief sugges-
tion that he or she be contacted and urged to take a particular position
on the matter, and there is no reference to the candidate's record, posi-
tion, statement, character, qualifications, or fitness for an office or to
an election, candidacy, or voting;
Alternative 3-C: (6)(i) Does not include express advocacy; (ii) Refers to
a specific piece of legislation or legislative proposal, either by formal
name, popular name or bill number; or refers to a general public policy
issue capable of redress by legislation or executive action; and (iii)
Contains a phone number, toll free number, mail address, or electronic
mail address, internet home page or other world wide web address for
the person or entity that the ad urges the viewer or listener to contact;
Alternative 3-D: (6) Urges support of or opposition to any legislation,
resolution, institutional action, or any policy proposal and only refers
to contacting a clearly identified candidate who is an incumbent legis-
lator to urge such legislator to support or oppose the matter, without
referring to any of the legislator's past or present positions; or
(7) Refers to a clearly identified Federal candidate in a public commu-
nication by a candidate for State or local office, individual holding
State or local office, or an association or similar group of candidates
for State or local office or of individuals holding State or local office, if
such mention of a Federal candidate is merely incidental to the candi-
dacy of one or more individuals for State or local office.2" 8
Prime Sponsors Rule
In the 2002 FEC rulemaking on electioneering communications,
the BCRA prime sponsors (Sen. McCain, Sen. Feingold, Rep. Shays,
Rep. Meehan, et al.) proposed the following rule for an exemption as
being within the FEC's authority and properly distinguishing genuine
from sham grassroots lobbying:
258. Electioneering Communication, 67 Fed. Reg. 51131, 51145 (Aug. 7, 2002).
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The term "electioneering communication" does not include any com-
munication that:
(x)(A) Meets all of the following criteria: (i) the communication con-
cerns only a legislative or executive branch matter; (ii) the communica-
tion's only reference to the clearly identified federal candidate is a
statement urging the public to contact the candidate and ask that he or
she take a particular position on the legislative or executive branch
matter; (iii) the communication refers to the candidate only by use of
the term "Your Congressman," "Your Senator," "Your Member of Con-
gress" or a similar reference and does not include the name or likeness
of the candidate in any form, including as part of an Internet address;
and (iv) the communication contains no reference to any political
party.
(B) The criteria in Paragraph (A) are not met if the communication
includes any reference to: (i) the candidate's record or position on any
issue; (ii) the candidate's character, qualifications or fitness for office;
or (iii) the candidate's election or candidacy.25 9
CRP Rule
In the 2002 FEC rulemaking on electioneering communications,
the Center for Responsive Politics (Lawrence Noble, Executive Direc-
tor) proposed the following rule for an exemption as being within the
FEC's authority and properly distinguishing genuine from sham grass-
roots lobbying:
(c) Electioneering communication does not include any communica-
tion that:
(6) (i) Contains the following elements:
(A) The communication is devoted exclusively to a
pending legislative or executive branch matter;
259. Detailed Comments of BCRA Sponsors Sen. John McCain, Sen. Russ Feingold, Rep.
Christopher Shays, Rep. Marty Meehan, Sen. Olympia Snowe, and Sen. James Jeffords at
10 (2002), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/electioneeringcomm/
comments/us-cong-members.pdf (attached to Letter from Sen. John McCain, et. al. to
Ms. Mai T. Dinh, Associate Legal Counsel, of the FEC. The Campaign and Media
Legal Center joined in proposing this rule, (see Letter from Glen Shor, Associate Legal
Counsel, Campaign and Legal Media Center, to Mai T. Dinh, Assistant General
Counsel, FEC, at 10-11 (Aug. 21, 2002) (Trevor Potter was named therein as General
Counsel)), as did Common Cause and Democracy 21 (see Letter from Donald J.
Simon, General Counsel, Common Cause and Democracy, to Mai T. Dinh, Assistant
General Counsel, FEC, at 12 (Aug. 22, 2002) (adding that "this proposed exception
properly balances the competing concerns" and avoids "sham communications")).
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(B) The communication's only reference to a clearly
identified Federal candidate is a statement urging
the public to contact that Federal candidate or a
reference that asks the candidate to take a partic-
ular position on the pending legislative or execu-
tive branch matter; and
(ii) Does not contain any of the following elements:
(A) Any reference to any political party, including the
candidate's political party;
(B) Any reference to the candidate's record or posi-
tion on any issue; or
(C) Any reference to the candidate's character, quali-
fications or fitness for office or to the candidate's
election or candidacy. 2 60
Commissioner Thomas Rule
In the 2002 FEC rulemaking on electioneering communications,
FEC Commissioner Scott Thomas proposed the following rule for an
exemption as being within the FEC's authority and properly distin-
guishing genuine from sham grassroots lobbying:
Meets the following criteria:
(i) Is devoted exclusively to a particular pending legislative or execu-
tive branch matter:
(ii) Only refers to a clearly identified Federal candidate in urging the
public to contact that Federal candidate to persuade him or her
to take a particular position on the pending legislative or execu-
tive branch matter; and
(iii) Does not contain... [a]ny reference to a political party or to the
political persuasion of the clearly identified candidate [or] ...
the candidate's record or position on any issue[,] . . . character,
qualifications, or fitness for office, or to an election, voters or the
voting public, or anyone's candidacy.
2 61
260. Letter from Lawrence Noble, Executive Director, Center for Responsive Politics,
and Paul Sanford, Director, FEC Watch, to Mai T. Dinh, Assistant General Counsel,
FEC (Aug. 21, 2002), available at http://www.fecwatch.org/law/regulations/pdfs/
electcommcomments.pdf (the quotation is from the attached "Comments of FEC
Watch and the Center for Responsive Politics" at 5-6).
261. Memorandum from Scott E. Thomas, FEC Commissioner, FEC, to the Federal
Election Commission 2 (Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/
agendas2002/mtgdocsO2-68a.pdf (Agenda Document No. 02-68-A).
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Broad Coalition Rule
This rule was proposed in early 2006 by counsel representing a
broad-spectrum coalition,262 and as stated by the FEC in Notice 2006-
4 sought an expedited rulemaking
to revise 11 CFR 100.29(c) to exempt from the definition of "election-
eering communication" certain "grassroots lobbying" communications
that reflect all of the following principles: 1. The "clearly identified
federal candidate" is an incumbent public officeholder; 2. The commu-
nication exclusively discusses a particular current legislative or execu-
tive branch matter; 3. The communication either (a) calls upon the
candidate to take a particular position or action with respect to the
matter in his or her incumbent capacity, or (b) calls upon the general
public to contact the candidate and urge the candidate to do so; 4. If
the communication discusses the candidate's position or record on the
matter, it does so only by quoting the candidate's own public state-
ments or reciting the candidate's official action, such as a vote, on the
matter; 5. The communication does not refer to an election, the candi-
date's candidacy, or a political party; and 6. The communication does
not refer to the candidate's character, qualifications or fitness for
office.263
Commissioner von Spakovsky Rule
Before the electioneering communication prohibition period pre-
ceding the 2006 general election, FEC Commissioner Hans A. von
Spakovsky proposed the following "Interim Final Rule Exempting
Grassroots Lobbying Communications From the Definition of 'Elec-
tioneering Communication' ":
(c) The following communications are exempt from the definition of
electioneering communication. Any communication that:
(6) Is a grassroots lobbying communication. For purposes of this sec-
tion, a grassroots lobbying communication is any communication that:
(i) References a clearly identified candidate for Federal office,
but refers to that candidate only in his or her capacity as an
incumbent public officeholder, does not reference that per-
262. Jan Witold Baran, Robert F. Bauer, Laurence E. Gold, Margaret E. McCormick
& John Pomeranz, Petition for Rulemaking: Electioneering Communication and
Grassroots Lobbying Exemption at 3 (Feb. 16, 2006), available at http://www.fec.gov/
pdf/nprm/lobbying/orig.petition.pdf.
263. Federal Election Commission Rulemaking Petition, 71 Fed. Reg. 13557 (March
16, 2006).
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son's character, qualifications, or fitness for office, and does
not refer to any Federal election or a political party;
(ii) Has as its subject matter a public policy issue under consid-
eration by Congress or the Executive Branch;
(iii) Urges the incumbent public officeholder to take a particular
position or action with respect to the public policy issue ref-
erenced in subsection (ii) above, or urges the general public
to contact the incumbent public officeholder for the purpose
of encouraging such position or action with respect to the
public policy issue referenced in subsection (ii) above;
(iv) Does not promote, support, attack, or oppose any candidate
for the office sought by the incumbent public officeholder ref-
erenced in subsection (i) above; and
(v) References the position or record of the incumbent public
officeholder on the public policy issue referenced in subsec-
tion (ii) above only by quoting that officeholder's own public
statements or reciting that officeholder's official actions, such
as a vote. A communication that does not discuss the position
or record of the incumbent public officeholder on the public
policy issue referenced in subsection (ii) above, but satisfies
subsections (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) is also a grassroots lobbying
communication.
(vi) Paragraph (c)(6) of this section shall not apply to any activi-
ties or communications after September 30, 2007.264
264. Memorandum from Hans A. von Spakovsky, FEC Commissioner, to the Federal
Election Commission 45-46 (Aug. 3, 2006), available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/
2006/mtgdocO6-53.pdf (Agenda Document No. 06-53 regarding the proposed Interim
Rule Exempting Grassroots Lobbying Communications From the Definition of
"Electioneering Communication").
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